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ESSAY
THE SECRET LIVES OF THE FOUR HORSEMEN
Barry Cushman*
Difficile est saturam non scribere.
_ Juvenal, Saturae, I, 30.
"f' utlined against red velvet drapery on the first Monday of
,.I October, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic
lore they are known as Famine, Pestilence, Destruction, and
Death. These are only aliases. Their real names are Van De-
vanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler. They formed the
crest of the reactionary cyclone before which yet another pro-
gressive statute was swept over the precipice yesterday morning
as a packed courtroom of spectators peered up at the bewilder-
ing panorama spread across the mahogany bench above."'
Or so Grantland Rice might have written, had he been a legal
realist. For more than two generations scholars have seen the
Four Horsemen as far right, reactionary, staunchly conservative
apostles of laissez-faire and Social Darwinism! And with good
reason. One need only read opinions such as those in Adkins v.
Children's HospitaP and Morehead v. Tipaldo,4 Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Alton Railroad and Ribnik v. McBride,6 Hammer
v. Dagenhart,7 and Carter Coal,8 and the dissents in such cases as
Nebbia,9 Blaisdell,'" the Gold Clause Cases,"1 and the Wagner Act
Cases" to understand why. One can hardly avoid coming away
from these and other decisions with the impression that these
were men fanatically devoted to property rights and callously
indifferent to the commonweal.
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. B.A., Amherst
College; M.A., J.D., Ph.D., University of Virginia. Thanks to Michal Belknap,
Patrice Cushman, Jack Goldsmith, John Harrison, Mike Klarman, Bill Nelson, and
Ted White for enduring earlier drafts, and to Todd Ammerman, Heather Hart, and
Andrew Krueger for helpful research assistance. An earlier and abbreviated version
of this essay was presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch
of the American Historical Society.
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Here and there one finds shreds of biographical evidence sug-
gesting that something like the milk of human kindness may
have flowed in parsimonious quantities through their veins. We
discover that Sutherland's legislative career saw him support the
eight-hour day, the Employers' Liability Act, the Pure Food and
Drugs Act, the Hepburn Rate Bill, the Children's Bureau, the
Seaman's Act of 1915, Postal Savings Banks, free coinage of sil-
ver, and the 1896 presidential candidacy of the populist William
Jennings Bryan. 3 We even find Sutherland in the vanguard of
the struggle for women's suffrage'4 and a system of workmen's
compensation for the employees of interstate carriers.'5 We read
of Butler's leadership in the fight for workmen's compensation
in his home state of Minnesota;'6 of his efforts on behalf of the
federal government in prosecuting Swift, Armour, and other
large meatpackers for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act;
of his special prosecution of Midwest millers for selling flour
bleached with nitrogen peroxide in violation of the Pure Food
and Drugs Act;7 and of his success in saving the Canadian gov-
ernment "huge sums of money in valuation proceedings against
some of the western railroads."'8 We are told of McReynolds'
role as an avid trustbuster for Presidents Taft and Wilson, of his
environmentalism, and of his generosity toward charitable
causes.'9 We learn of Van Devanter's reputed sensitivity to the
plight of the Native American.' But such paltry gestures of con-
cern for the underdog have been far from sufficient to rebut
Fred Rodell's charge that their jurisprudence was driven by
"their basic and bone-deep Hamiltonian empathy with the well-
to-do....""
When one dips a bit deeper into the U.S. Reports, however,
one discovers some startling data. One finds the Four Horse-
men actually supporting liberal case outcomes. At first one is
inclined to dismiss these cases as mere aberrations, attributable
perhaps to the dull Horsemen's inability to recognize when the
liberals were pulling the wool over their eyes. But the cases
continue to mount until the sheer volume is so immense as to
point irrefragably to only one conclusion: The Four Horsemen
were themselves closet liberals. Itappears that they struck a re-
actionary pose in celebrated cases in order to retain the good
graces of the conservative sponsors to whom they owed their
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positions and whose social amenities they continued to enjoy,
while in legions of low-profile cases they quietly struck blows
for their own left-liberal agendas. In this way, it seems, the
Horsemen could continue to enjoy access to the corridors of
power and influence and the hospitality of the most fashionable
Washington salons, while at the same time working surrepti-
tiously to undermine the very causes that their conservative pa-
trons held most dear. Theirs, then, is not a simple story of
handmaidens of the industrial and financial elite. It is instead a
tale of luxury and deceit.
I.
If there's anything a good conservative can't stand, it's a tax-
and-spend liberal. One immediately becomes suspicious of the
sincerity of the Four Horsemen's devotion to the conservative
cause when one recognizes the extent of their complicity in a
veritable orgy of revenue enhancement. Throughout their ten-
ures on the high bench, the Four Horsemen repeatedly sus-
tained the power of big government to take other people's
money.' In case after case they turned back assaults on the
hated federal income tax.' They upheld scores of taxes on busi-
ness in the face of every conceivable manner of constitutional
challenge."' As traitors to their class they also cheerfully acqui-
esced in numerous confiscations of inherited wealth, voting to
uphold imposition of various state and federal estate, gift, in-
heritance and succession taxes.' The most important of these
decisions was the 1927 case of Florida v. Mellon,6 in which the
state challenged a section of the federal estate tax granting a
credit for state inheritance taxes paid. The death-tax free state
of Florida, the emergent mecca for snowbirds fleeing the severe
winters and steep inheritance taxes of the northern states,
charged that the section in question constituted "an invasion of
the sovereign rights of the state and a direct effort on the part of
Congress to coerce the state into imposing an inheritance tax
and to penalize it and its property and citizens for the failure to
do so. '7 Each of his fellow Horsemen joined Sutherland's opin-
ion rebuffing Florida's attack. "If the act interferes with the ex-
ercise by the state of its full powers of taxation or has the effect
of removing property from its reach which otherwise would be
1997]
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within it," remarked Sutherland, "that is a contingency which af-
fords no ground for judicial relief. The act is a law of the United
States made in pursuance of the Constitution and, therefore, the
supreme law of the land, the constitution or laws of the states to
the contrary notwithstanding. Whenever the constitutional
powers of the federal government and those of the state come
into conflict, the latter must yield."'
Six years later Paul and Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush,
authors of the Wisconsin state unemployment statute, were vis-
iting Justice Brandeis at his summer cottage in Chatham, Massa-
chusetts. During a typically lighthearted Brandeis family chat,
Paul groused that concerns over placing their own businesses at
a competitive disadvantage had kept other states from following
Wisconsin's lead. Brandeis' reply was instantaneous. "Have
you considered the case of Florida v. Mellon?"29 he asked. What
Brandeis was suggesting, as he later made explicit in his behind-
the-scenes campaign for enactment of the Wagner-Lewis social
security bill, was that the federal government could use its
taxing power to prod the states into enacting unemployment
compensation programs in precisely the way that the provision
upheld in Florida v. Mellon had encouraged states to enact state
inheritance taxes. Congress could simply impose a uniform na-
tional payroll tax on all employers, the proceeds to be paid into
a federal unemployment insurance fund. Employers would be
allowed a credit against the federal tax for any amount paid into
a comparable insurance plan established by their own states.
The states would presumably respond as they had to the enact-
ment of the federal estate tax credit at issue in Florida v.
Mellon-by enacting their own unemployment compensation
plans. The race to the bottom would thus be avoided through a
scheme of cooperative federalism. Working from the constitu-
tional blueprint suggested by Brandeis, Paul Raushenbush and
Tom Eliot prepared a draft which formed the basis of what
became the unemployment insurance provisions of the Social
Security Act of 1935.0 Both the bill's principal Senate sponsor
and government counsel defended its constitutionality on the
authority of Florida v. Mellon,3' and Sutherland's handiwork was
central to Justice Cardozo's opinion upholding the Act in




Sutherland and Van Devanter could not afford to be seen
supporting so liberal a result in such a high profile case. They
had already pushed the envelope by silently acquiescing in Car-
dozo's opinion upholding the old-age pension provisions of the
Act.33 They had to appear in the opposing column in the news-
paper reports, even though they could be sure that few would
actually read what they recorded in dissent. Accordingly, Suth-
erland fashioned an opinion in which he weakly objected to sec-
tions of the Act requiring the states to pay the proceeds from
their payroll taxes into the federal treasury, to be withdrawn
only by state agencies approved by the federal board. The im-
position wrought by these easily revisable and relatively unim-
portant administrative provisions, he lamely maintained, did not
"comport with the dignity of a quasi-sovereign state."34 But one
could tell that his heart was not in the effort, for even as he nit-
picked at the Act's periphery he swallowed whole its core.
"With most of what is said in the opinion just handed down, I
concur," he confessed.35
I agree that the payroll tax levied is an excise within the power
of Congress; that the devotion of not more than 90% of it to
the credit of employers in states which require the payment of a
similar tax under so-called unemployment-tax laws is not an
unconstitutional use of the proceeds of the federal tax; that the
provision making the adoption by the state of an unemploy-
ment law of a specified character a condition precedent to the
credit of the tax does not render the law invalid. I agree that
the states are not coerced by the federal legislation into adopt-
ing unemployment legislation. The provisions of the federal
law may operate to induce the state to pass an unemployment
law if it regards such action to be in its interest. 6
"But that," he wrote, echoing his opinion of a decade earlier, "is
not coercion."'3 At the end of his career Sutherland could no
longer bring himself to the heights of duplicity manifest in
McReynolds' and Butler's Tenth Amendment rants against the
whole idea of federal social security.38 His paternity was undeni-
able. It is for his opinion in Florida v. Mellon and all that it
spawned that Sutherland is known to this day among the con-
servative cognoscenti as "the tax collector for the welfare state."
1997] 563
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Of course, if you're going to have a welfare state you have to
be able to spend the money you collect. Here again Sutherland
and company laid the constitutional foundation for the Great
Society. Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon
39
involved constitutional challenges to the Sheppard-Towner Ma-
ternity Aid Act of 1921, which established a federal grant-in-aid
program for the reduction of maternal and infant mortality.
Under the statute, Congress appropriated funds to be disbursed
to states that established qualifying programs for the promotion
of maternal and infant health. The Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts attacked the statute on several grounds, alleging that
the appropriations in support of the program were for local
rather than national purposes and therefore beyond the powers
of Congress; that they were an attempt to induce the states to
yield a portion of their reserved sovereign rights upon pain of
losing the share of the appropriation to which they would oth-
erwise be entitled, and therefore an invasion of the powers of
local self-government reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment; and that the burden of the appropriations fell
unequally upon the several states, and rested largely upon such
industrial states as Massachusetts. Frothingham, a citizen of
Massachusetts, complained that the appropriations would in-
crease the burden of future federal taxation and thereby, under
the guise of taxation, take her property without due process of
law.
Sutherland, flanked by each of his fellow equestrians, made
short work of each of these contentions. First, Massachusetts
had presented the Court with no justiciable controversy. The
state could not, as parens patriae, institute judicial proceedings
to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of
federal statutes.' Nor could the state sue to enjoin the statute's
execution on its own behalf, for such a suit presented a question
"political and not judicial in character, and therefore not a mat-
ter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power."" Yet
though he dispatched Massachusetts' complaints on justiciability
grounds, he could not entirely conceal his contempt for the
state's whiny effort to thwart the program with the Tenth
Amendment. "[T]he powers of the State are not invaded," he
insisted, "since the statute imposes no obligation but simply ex-
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tends an option which the State is free to accept or reject."42
"[N]othing has been done and nothing is to be done without
[the States'] consent."'43 The statute did not "require the States
to do or to yield anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulte-
rior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose may be ef-
fectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding."'
Sutherland dispatched Ms. Frothingham's complaint with equal
alacrity." Her interest in the moneys of the federal treasury,
shared with millions of others, was so "minute and indetermin-
able" as to deny her standing to challenge the appropriation.'
"In the Maternity Act cases," Benjamin Wright later ob-
served, "the Court had refused to review the constitutionality of
national expenditures for a purpose that was clearly within the
domain of the powers reserved to the states." 7 These decisions,
remarked Carl Swisher, "indicated that, whether or not Con-
gress had the constitutional power to make grants-in-aid of the
types being made, there was no manner of bringing about a ju-
dicial determination that the acts were unconstitutional."4
'
"Neither a state nor an individual taxpayer could challenge the
validity of such a use of moneys in the courts. 49 Henceforth, ob-
served the always insightful Edward Corwin, "so long as Con-
gress has the prudence to lay and collect taxes without specify-
ing the purposes to which the proceeds from any particular tax
are to be devoted, it may continue to appropriate the national
funds without judicial let or hindrance."' "Thus," wrote Wright,
"the spending of billions of dollars in civilian relief, and in the
building of public works was beyond the range of constitutional
litigation."5' Indeed, "the principal way in which the Court sus-
tained the New Deal measures was by refusing to pass upon the
validity of the spending power."52
Perhaps you will say that Sutherland's opinion in Frothing-
ham merely reflects his genuine concern for the foundational
principles of separation of powers.' Perhaps the liberation of
the spending power wrought by his hands was merely incidental,
an unintended consequence of his fidelity to axioms of govern-
mental structure. Perhaps. But somehow its seems more likely
that he and his fellow Horsemen anticipated, perhaps only un-
consciously (for they were unconscious for a good bit of the
decade), that this opinion would lay the foundation for the luxu-
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riation of a hegemonic class of social welfare bureaucrats.' This
is undoubtedly why observers in the courtroom that day wit-
nessed Van Devanter giggling uncontrollably as Sutherland read
his opinion from the bench."
II.
Economic royalists have long railed against wasteful regula-
tion of business, maintaining that government meddling is a
tremendous drag on economic expansion. But if vibrant growth
required getting government off the backs of the people, the
Four Horsemen were repeatedly guilty of piling on instead.
They upheld a simply enormous array of state police power
regulations. 6 They sustained extensive state supervision of the
business operations' and of the rates charged58 by enterprises
impressed with a public interest. They had turned back dozens
of obscure Contracts Clause challenges before their celebrated
dissents in Blaisdell.9 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,' generally
thought to represent the modern Court at its most deferential,
involved an Oklahoma statute making it unlawful for anyone
other than a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit
lenses to a face, or to duplicate or replace lenses without a writ-
ten prescription from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.
Oklahoma opticians cried foul, but the Justices rejected their
due process and equal protection claims. The principal author-
ity on which the Williamson Court relied was Roschen v. Ward,6
in which all Four Horsemen had joined the Court's opinion up-
holding a New York statute making it unlawful to sell eyeglasses
at retail in any store unless a duly licensed physician or optome-
trist was in charge and in personal attendance. "Of course we
cannot suppose the Act to have been passed for sinister mo-
tives," wrote Justice Holmes for a unanimous Court. "We can-
not say, as the complainants would have us say, that the sup-
posed benefits [of the Act] are a cloak for establishing a
monopoly and a pretence."'62 The Horsemen's repute as guardi-
ans of economic liberty dims further when one notes the myriad
schemes for occupational licensing in which they acquiesced. In
fact, less than two years before depriving New York theater-
goers of the benefit of a statute regulating resale ticket prices,"
McReynolds and company had ducked the price regulation is-
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sue raised by the statute in order to sustain its provisions re-
quiring scalpers to secure licenses.65 Perhaps the Horsemen did
strike down two regulations of employment agencies for every
one they upheld.' But they sustained twice as many statutes
regulating bread weight as they invalidated, 7 leaving Spenceri-
ans with at best half a loaf.
The Horsemen were equally headless in their solicitude for
the federal leviathan.' They upheld a vast array of national
regulatory incursions, including (but not limited to) the Pure
Food and Drugs Act,69 the Employers' Liability Act, ° the Safety
Appliance Act,7 ' the Packers and Stockyards Act,2 and the
Grain'Futures Act." They wrote or joined numerous opinions in
which the constitutionality of a wide variety of New Deal initia-
tives was either sustained or assumed.74 They voted to uphold
more Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") orders than
you can shake a stick at. They repeatedly supported Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") efforts to curb unfair trade prac-
tices.76 They sided with the government or private plaintiffs in
dozens of antitrust cases involving all kinds of business," in-
cluding railroads,78 trade associations,"7 and such major manufac-
turing concerns as Standard Oil, American Tobacco, IBM, In-
ternational Harvester, ALCOA, Borden, Eastman Kodak, and
Shell Oil.'
In order to maintain a veneer of evenhandedness amidst this
spree of trustbusting, however, the Horsemen occasionally
found it necessary to use the Sherman Act to knock a few union
heads together as well.' Yet the gobbledygook rationale em-
ployed in such anti-union decisions in turn served to legitimate
their efforts to thwart various other unionbusting campaigns. In
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,82 for example, Van
Devanter and McReynolds joined Chief Justice Taft's opinion
reversing a Sherman Act judgment against an organization al-
leged to have preferred to blow up the company's mine rather
than see it operated on a non-union basis. "Coal mining is not
interstate commerce, and the power of Congress does not ex-
tend to its regulation as such," Taft asserted. 3
"The making of goods and the mining of coal are not com-
merce, nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards
shipped or used in interstate commerce, make their production
1997] 567
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a part thereof." Obstruction to coal mining is not a direct ob-
struction to interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course,
may affect it by reducing the amount of coal to be carried in
that commerce.?
In order for a conspiracy to be actionable under the antitrust
law, Taft maintained, "the intent to injure, obstruct or restrain
interstate commerce must appear as an obvious consequence of
what is to be done, or be shown by direct evidence or other cir-
cumstances." The record supplied no such proof of intent. This
was a "local" strike, beyond the reach of federal law." In United
Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co.,'
McReynolds and Sutherland joined Taft's opinion holding that
a strike for a closed shop, conducted by means of illegal picket-
ing and intimidation, did not violate the Sherman Act. The
strike was admittedly designed to prevent the manufacture of
goods to be shipped in interstate commerce. Yet there was no
evidence that the strikers had sought to interfere with the trans-
port or sale of goods once they had been manufactured. A mere
hope that the decline in sales would induce the company to yield
was insufficient.
[T]he mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped
in interstate commerce, by the illegal or tortious prevention of
its manufacture, is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction
to that commerce. It is only when the intent or necessary effect
upon such commerce in the article is to enable those preventing
the manufacture to monopolize the supply, control its price or
discriminate as between its would-be purchasers, that the un-
lawful interference with its manufacture can be said directly to
burden interstate commerce. 7
In Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,8 each of his fellow
Horsemen joined Sutherland's opinion rebuffing an employer's
request to enjoin a strike and boycott for a closed shop. The
structural steel fabricated and erected by the company in New
York City was transported from other states, and the company
asserted that the effect of the union's actions was to destroy the
company's interstate traffic in steel. Even assuming that to be
the case, Sutherland responded, that did not bring the union's
behavior within the ambit of the Sherman Act's prohibitions.
"[T]he sole aim of the conspiracy was to halt or suppress local
[Vol. 83:559
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building operations as a means of compelling the employment
of union labor, not for the purpose of affecting the sale or transit
of materials in interstate commerce," he wrote."
Use of the materials was purely a local matter, and the suppres-
sion thereof the result of the pursuit of a purely local aim. Re-
straint of interstate commerce was not an object of the conspir-
acy. Prevention of the local use was in no sense a means
adopted to effect such a restraint. It is this exclusively local
aim, and not the fortuitous and incidental effect on interstate
commerce, which gives character to the conspiracy. If thereby
the shipment of steel in interstate commerce was curtailed, that
result was incidental, indirect and remote .... '
Yet when a member of the Seaman's Union of America com-
plained that he had been unlawfully deprived of employment
opportunity by a combination of merchant shipowners, each of
his fellow Horsemen joined Sutherland's opinion distinguishing
these cases. The shipowners' scheme to control the employment
of all seamen on the Pacific Coast ran afoul of the Sherman Act
because
the combination and the acts complained of did not spend their
intended and direct force upon a local situation.. On the con-
trary, they related to the employment of seamen for service on
ships, both of them instrumentalities of, and intended to be
used in, interstate and foreign commerce; and the immediate
force of the combination, both in purpose and execution, was
directed toward affecting such commerce. The interference
with commerce, therefore, was direct and primary, and not, as
in the cases cited, incidental, indirect and secondary.9'
By contrast, when union glass blowers and an association of
window glass manufacturers entered into an agreement to fix
wages and seasonally rotate the labor force between two sets of
factories, all Four Horsemen joined the opinion rejecting the
government's Sherman Act challenge.'
The ingenue will undoubtedly interject, "But Bruce, aren't
you being unduly cynical? I mean, gee whiz, it seems like maybe
the notion that the internal affairs of local enterprises engaged
in production were beyond the reach of the Sherman Act unless
intended to restrain interstate commerce might reconcile not
only the labor cases, but the business antitrust cases as well.93
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The idea that productive activity was generally beyond the
reach of federal regulatory authority might explain why, for ex-
ample, the NIRA,94 the AAA95 and the Guffey Coal Act96 fell,
while all of those state business taxes survived dormant com-
merce clause challenges." The distinction between production
and transportation might also help account for the fact that the
Horsemen voted to uphold the labor provisions of the Trans-
portation Act of 1920,98 the Railway Labor Act" and its 1934
Amendments,"0 and the Wagner Act when applied to businesses
engaged in interstate transportation or communication,0 ' yet
voted to invalidate the NLRA as applied to local manufacturing
concerns. 2 Maybe it even helps to explain why Van Devanter
voted to uphold Illinois' Child Labor Act °J while voting to in-
validate federal child labor laws."
To this I have two responses. First, stop calling me Bruce.
Second, perhaps you didn't get the word, grasshopper, but we
are all realists now. Arthur Schlesinger taught us long ago that
federalism is simply the manipulable rallying cry of embittered
political losers." But let us indulge your flatulent hypothesis.
How would you explain, for starters, McReynolds and Butler's
subsequent concurrence in decisions applying the Wagner Act
to entities engaged in local production?"° Stare decisis? Come
now.' 7 Surely Lochner" supplied adequate precedent to justify
striking down all of those working hours statutes they voted to
uphold?'" And isn't it interesting that they voted to strike down
the minimum wage,"' so vigorously opposed by Sutherland's
pals in the feminist camp,"' while voting to uphold every other
variety of wage payment statute designed to protect workers
from overreaching employers?"2
Moreover, how does your federalism thesis explain the
Horsemen's pro-worker stance in a legion of Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act and Federal Safety Appliance Act cases,"3 in
which they often strained to find that the injured plaintiff was
engaged in interstate commerce?" ' Here the contrast between
two particular cases is instructive. The plaintiff in the 1919 case
of Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Smith"' was a
cook assigned to a "camp car," whose duty it was to prepare
meals for a crew of bridge carpenters who lived on the car and
repaired railroad bridges for the company. The cook, injured
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while whipping up cuisine for the carpenters, sought recovery
under the FELA. Van Devanter and McReynolds joined the
Court's opinion upholding judgment for the plaintiff. The
bridge carpenters were engaged in interstate commerce because
they were maintaining instrumentalities of such commerce, and
the cook, by virtue of the assistance he rendered to the carpen-
ters, was similarly engaged in such commerce. A quarter cen-
tury later, however, the "Roosevelt Court" would hold that a
cook who prepared and served meals to maintenance-of-way
employees of an interstate railroad pursuant to a contract be-
tween his employer and the railroad company was not "engaged
in commerce" within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards
Act."6 This application of the "too many cooks" principle
opened new frontiers in the domain of gastronomic jurispru-
dence.
I suppose that the Horsemen might have been able to pass off
their votes to sustain workmen's compensation statutes as pro-
business efforts to control and regularize the cost of industrial
accidents."' But the diligent auditor would not be so easily
hoodwinked. For this would not explain why they so often sup-
ported injured workers in contested workmen's compensation
cases."8 Nor would it account for their many pro-plaintiff deci-
sions in tort litigation involving injured employees,"9 in which
they routinely upheld statutes abrogating the unholy trinity of
common law defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and the fellow servant rule." Add to this their bleeding-
heart record in tort litigation generally,'2 ' and it is little wonder
that the Horsemen were the secret darlings of the trial lawyers.
III.
Sometimes the Four Horsemen liked to relax. One of their
favorite ways to unwind was to turn loose convicted criminals on
the basis of technicalities. And since Prohibition had deprived
them of the right to blow off a little steam over a cocktail, they
particularly relished liberating liquor's freedom fighters. Of
course, Prohibition wasn't all bad. It had created entrepreneu-
rial opportunities for ethnic minorities who experienced wide-
spread discrimination in such middle-class professions as law,
medicine, accounting and teaching." But if southern and east-
1997]
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ern European immigrants were to be economically empowered
by the Noble Experiment, convictions would have to be over-
turned where defendants with names like Gambino'" and
Lefkowitz 2 were involved.
Van Devanter and McReynolds had evidenced a predisposi-
tion to intervene in such cases as early as 1915. In Rossi v.
Pennsylvania" an Ohio liquor dealer had been convicted of
selling liquor in the adjoining Pennsylvania county without a
Pennsylvania liquor license. Both Justices joined the Court's
opinion reversing the conviction on the ground that the statute,
as applied to a sale in interstate commerce, ran afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause.'26 But it was during the Prohibition
era that the Horsemen really hit their stride. Consider, for ex-
ample, Sgro v. United States,27 in which a federal officer had ob-
tained a warrant to search the premises of the accused for booze
in early July. Under the National Prohibition Act such warrants
expired ten days after their issuance. The officer did not get.
around to searching the premises until late July, but before do-
ing so he returned to the magistrate and had the warrant re-
dated and reissued based upon the original affidavit. The ac-
cused was convicted based on evidence obtained during the
subsequent search, and on appeal all Four Horsemen voted to
overturn the conviction. Over the dissents of Stone and Car-
dozo, the Court held that the warrant had been invalid-once
the original warrant had expired, a new warrant had to be issued
based on a new affidavit stating probable cause at that time. If
you think this seems picky, consider Grau v. United States.'2
There a federal officer obtained a warrant to search a private
dwelling for evidence of violation of the liquor laws based on an
affidavit stating that he had seen people hauling cans commonly
used in handling whiskey and what appeared to be corn sugar
into the house, and had smelled the odor of cooking mash
coming from the place. A search turned up a still and 350 gal-
lons of whiskey, which were placed in evidence at trial. With all
Four Horsemen joining the opinion, the Court, again over the
dissents of Stone and Cardozo, reversed the convictions. The
pertinent provision of the Prohibition Act permitted issuance of
warrants to search private dwellings only if there was probable
cause to believe that the dwelling was being used for the unlaw-
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ful sale of liquor. Here the affidavit stated facts alleging unlaw-
ful manufacture, but not unlawful sale. Accordingly the warrant
was void, and the evidence inadmissible.'29
McReynolds and Butler continued to wage this fight to the
end, even after the Eighteenth Amendment had been repealed.
Butler's dissent in Olmstead v. United States"' would be vindi-
cated in 1937, when the Court overturned a conviction in an al-
cohol smuggling case. In Nordane v. United States,'3 Butler
joined the majority opinion holding that evidence introduced at
the defendants' trial had been acquired in violation of the
Communications Act of 1934. (In 1939 McReynolds, then the
sole remaining Horseman, joined the Court's opinion following
Nordane and overturning convictions for conspiracy to use the
mails to defraud, which were obtained on the basis of evidence
acquired through wiretaps in violation of the Communications
Act. This came as a great relief to named defendants Alfred
and Joseph Weiss, as well as to their co-defendants, Messrs.
Berger, Spitz, Messman, Goldstein, and Krupp.'32)
The Horsemen managed to make this subversive assault on
temperance somewhat more palatable by at least occasionally
voting to extend its benefits to rum runners of Northern Euro-
pean heritage as well. In Carroll v. United States 3 Van Devan-
ter and Butler joined Chief Justice Taft's opinion upholding the
warrantless search of the defendant's car, while only McRey-
nolds and Sutherland dissented. "The damnable character of
the 'bootlegger's' business should not close our eyes to the mis-
chief which will surely follow any attempt to destroy it by un-
warranted methods," McReynolds thundered with Warrenesque
righteousness.'" The common law authorized arrests for misde-
meanors only where the crime had been committed in the offi-
cer's presence, and here the federal agents had arrested the de-
fendants upon "mere suspicion. "135 As the arrest had been
invalid, the search incident thereto was similarly invalid, and the
evidence thereby produced ought to have been suppressed. "If
an officer, upon mere suspicion of a misdemeanor, may stop one
on the public highway, take articles away from him and thereaf-
ter use them as evidence to convict him of crime," McReynolds
queried, "what becomes of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments?"'" In Sorrells v. United States'37 Van Devanter, Suther-
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land, and Butler joined the majority opinion reversing a convic-
tion on the grounds that the Prohibition Act had not been in-
tended to apply where an otherwise innocent defendant had
been lured into a sale of liquor at the instigation of a Prohibition
agent, and evidence of entrapment had not been permitted to go
to the jury. Each of his fellow Horsemen joined Brother
McReynolds' opinion in Nathanson v. .United States'38 invalidat-
ing a warrant to search a private dwelling for booze on the
grounds that it had been issued based on mere belief and suspi-
cion rather than upon probable cause. And in United States v.
Chambers139 all Four Horsemen joined the Court's opinion
holding that all prosecutions for violations of the Prohibition
Act pending at the time the Twenty-First Amendment had been
ratified had to be dropped."
In light of this sustained use of nit-picking technicalities in
their campaign to subvert Prohibition, it probably comes as no
surprise that the Horsemen embraced a similar strategy in their
efforts to undermine our War on Drugs. In the 1916 case of
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,"'4 for example, both Van Devan-
ter and McReynolds voted to affirm the quashing of an indict-
ment for conspiracy to possess opium and morphine for a non-
medicinal purpose without paying the tax prescribed by the
Harrison Narcotics Act, on the ground that the possession con-
spired for did not fall within the Act's prohibitions." This was
merely a warm-up, however, for the full frontal assault they
were to launch against the Act in United States v. Doremus."3
There both McReynolds and Van Devanter joined Chief Justice
White's dissenting opinion denouncing the Act as an unconstitu-
tional violation of-get this-the Tenth Amendment. The Act
was "beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact,"
they agreed, reveling in the deployment of the old federalism
ruse, because it was "a mere attempt by Congress to exert a
power not delegated, that is, the reserved police power of the
States."'" McReynolds would momentarily vindicate this dissent
in Linder v. United States'5 where, joined by each of his fellow
Horsemen, he wrote the opinion reversing the conviction of a
physician for prescribing morphine and cocaine for a known ad-
dict. Referring to the "unfortunate condition" of such addicts,
who were "diseased and proper subjects" for the administration
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of drugs in order to relieve conditions incident to addiction,
McReynolds opined that regulation of medical practice was a
matter reserved to the states and accordingly beyond the power
of Congress.'" The victory proved to be Pyrrhic, however, and
Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds, again banging the drum of
federalism, found themselves in dissent three years later when
the Court sustained the Act's constitutionality and affirmed the
conviction of Frank Nigro for unlawful sale of an ounce of mor-
phine. 7 McReynolds and Butler would rail in vain and upon
multiple grounds against the conviction for unlawful possession
of morphine in Casey v. United States.'48 McReynolds, joined by
Butler, contended that one possessing an unstamped package of
morphine could not be presumed to have purchased it unlaw-
fully."' 9 Butler, joining Brandeis, contended that Casey's convic-
tion should have been overturned because the government had
entrapped him."5 And Butler, dissenting alone, opined that the
federal government had no power to make mere purchase or
possession of morphine a crime.'
Though they would lose their war on the War on Drugs, the
Horsemen would continue to engage in guerrilla skirmishing
with the authorities, taking what few small victories they could.
In United States v. Daugherty'52 each of his fellow Horsemen
joined McReynolds' opinion criticizing a fifteen year sentence
for three separate sales of cocaine as "extremely harsh" and
unjustified by the circumstances disclosed by the record, and
remanding the case for reconsideration of the appropriate pun-
ishment.'53 In 1925 they would intervene on behalf of Frank Ag-
nello, who had been convicted of conspiring to sell cocaine in
violation of the Act. Agnello had been arrested several blocks
from his home and, while he was held in custody elsewhere, the
police had conducted a warrantless search of his residence. The
search had turned up a can of cocaine, which had been placed in
evidence at Agnello's trial. Butler, joined by each of his fellow
Horsemen, penned the opinion reversing the conviction on the
grounds that "one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a
search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein."
"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is con-
cealed in a dwelling house," wrote Butler, "furnishes no justifi-
cation for a search of that place without a warrant."'' The
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Horsemen fired their parting shots at a drug-free America in the
1939 case of Lanzetta v. New Jersey,'55 where McReynolds joined
Butler's opinion striking down on vagueness grounds a statute
criminalizing gang membership.
The Horsemen's taste for husbanding the culture of deca-
dence ran to the prurient as well. Though Van Devanter would
vote to uphold the Mann White Slave Act against constitutional
challenge,56 all Four Horsemen would join an opinion reversing
the conviction of a man and woman for conspiracy to violate the
Act. The couple had admittedly taken an interstate journey
whose itinerary included frequent stops for fornication. Yet the
Court held that the transported woman was capable neither of
committing nor of conspiring to commit any offense under the
Act. As the man had conspired with no one else for the forbid-
den transportation, his conspiracy conviction had to be vacated
as well." Similarly, the bachelor McReynolds would file a lone
dissent in United States v. Limehouse, 8 in which the Court up-
held the conviction of a man for mailing "filthy" letters con-
taining language Justice Brandeis described as "coarse, vulgar,
disgusting, indecent" and "foul."'59
Much of the groundwork for this riot of punition-free turpi-
tude had been laid by Van Devanter's quiet acquiescence in the
promulgation of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States.'" But this only begins to tell the story of their softness on
crime. The Horsemen took an equally hard line in cases in-
volving the privilege against self-incrimination. In Kercheval v.
United States,6' each of his fellow Horsemen joined Butler's
opinion holding that a plea of guilty, withdrawn with leave of
the court, was inadmissible at the subsequent trial. In Brown v.
Mississippi62 all Four Horsemen joined in overturning convic-
tions for murder secured on the basis of confessions obtained
through police torture.'63 They similarly joined opinions revers-
ing federal' and state'65 murder convictions obtained on the ba-
sis of confessions elicited under coercive circumstances. And in
the 1939 case of Bruno v. United States,'" McReynolds voted to
overturn a narcotics conviction where the trial court had refused
to admonish the jury that the accused's failure to testify in his
own defense gave rise to no negative inference.'67
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The Horsemen defended the Sixth Amendment rights of con-
frontation and counsel with equal vigor. Cooke v. United
States'" involved charges of contempt of court committed by a
lawyer outside the courtroom. All Four Horsemen joined the
Court's opinion upholding the alleged contemnor's rights to be
advised of the charges against him, and to be afforded the op-
portunity to defend or explain his actions, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desired.'69 Sutherland, and Butler joined the dis-
senting opinion contending for the right of the accused to be
present at a jury viewing of the scene of the crime in Snyder v.
Massachusetts.' All Four Horsemen joined an opinion strenu-
ously upholding the right of the accused's counsel to attempt to
discredit a hostile witness on cross-examination in Alford v.
United States,"' while Van Devanter joined Suthlerland's famous
opinion in Powell v. Alabama"' holding that the Due Process
Clause entitled indigent defendants in a capital case to effective,
court-appointed counsel.'73
The Horsemen were notably vigilant as well in defending the
right to trial by an impartial jury of one's peers. In Aldridge v.
United States,"4 Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler voted to
reverse the conviction of a black man charged with the murder
of a white policeman on the ground that his attorney had not
been permitted to ask potential jurors whether they harbored
any racial prejudice that might prevent a fair and impartial ver-
dict. The Horsemen cast numerous votes to overturn convic-
tions of African-Americans where blacks had been systemati-
cally excluded from the grand juries that indicted or the petit
juries that tried them."5 McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler
dissented when the majority abandoned a long-standing prece-
dent that had disqualified federal employees from sitting as ju-
rors in federal trials on the grounds that they were presump-
tively biased in the government's favor.'76 Each of his fellow
Horsemen joined Sutherland's opinion holding that one prose-
cuted for reckless driving in the District of Columbia was enti-
"tled to be heard by a jury," and when the Court held that deal-
ing in second-hand property without a license was a petty




The Horsemen also repeatedly intervened when misconduct
by the judge, the prosecutor or the community interfered with
the defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.
Each of his fellow Horsemen joined Sutherland's opinion in
Berger v. United States,'79 holding that the prosecutor's conduct
on cross-examination of witnesses and in his argument to the
jury had been so egregious as to warrant a new trial. In Moore
v. Dempsey,'" Van Devanter and Butler joined in reversing an
order dismissing a petition for habeas corpus where the defen-
dant's murder trial had been hurried to conviction under the
pressure of a mob.' Perhaps the most famous instance of judi-
cial misbehavior occurred at the Espionage Act trial of the
noted socialist editor Victor Berger and his associates. Presid-
ing Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis had made extended re-
marks impugning the loyalty of German-Americans, including
the unforgettable, "If anybody has said anything worse about
the Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can use it."
On appeal Van Devanter joined the opinion holding that Lan-
dis' bias had rendered him unfit to preside over the trial."n But
the Horsemen intervened in several lesser-known causes as well.
McReynolds dissented in Horning v. District of Columbia,'83
which affirmed a criminal conviction in spite of the fact that the
trial judge had effectively directed the jury to convict. All Four
Horsemen joined the Court's opinion in Quercia v. United
States,' which overturned a conviction where the jury charge
had accused the defendant of prodigious, perjurious prevarica-
tion. Each of them also joined the Court's opinion in United
States v. Murdock'85 which, over the dissents of Stone and Car-
dozo, held that it was reversible error for the trial judge to in-
form the jury of his view that the accused was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Shields v. United States' all Four Horse-
men joined in reversing a conviction where the judge had sent
written instructions to a deadlocked jury without notice to the
accused. All Four Horsemen similarly joined in reversing the
conviction for violation of the liquor laws in Tumey v. Ohio."7
There the state had set up a scheme of compensation for certain
judicial officers under which the officer received payment for his
services only if the defendant were convicted. This scheme,
reminiscent of that established by the Fugitive Slave Act of
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1850, was held to deny the accused due process of law." Yet
where a trial judge had shortened the sentence a convict had al-
ready begun to serve, each of his fellow Horsemen joined Suth-
erland's opinion upholding the lower court's action against the
charge that it usurped the executive's pardoning power.' 9 Com-
pare this with Ex parte Grossman,90 and it's not difficult to see
what's going on. Philip Grossman had flouted an order enjoin-
ing violation of the Prohibition Act and had been punished for
contempt by a federal district judge. President Harding had
commuted Grossman's sentence, and the government con-
tended that permitting presidential pardons for defendants
found guilty of criminal contempt unduly impinged upon the in-
dependence of the judiciary. All Four Horsemen joined an
opinion upholding the President's action.' To top all this off,
Butler registered the lone dissent from Cardozo's opinion in
Palko v. Connecticut"9 holding that the prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy did not apply to the states.
The behavior of the Four Horsemen in these and other crimi-
nal cases'93 admits of at least two possible interpretations. One
interpretation would see these criminal procedure cases as of a
piece with some of their decisions in economic substantive due
process cases. On this view liberty of contract, the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right
against self-incrimination might be seen as manifestations of an
integrated vision of "negative" civic liberty. 4 Perhaps, it might
be argued, the Four Horsemen simply did not differentiate eco-
nomic from noneconomic forms of civil liberty in the way that
has come to be seen as obvious and natural in modern liberal
thought, and in liberal constitutionalism at least since the Carol-
ene Products footnote.95 The more clear-eyed interpretation,
however, recognizes (as the Four Horsemen surely did) that this
explanation is precisely the kind of ideological pap that bour-
geois suckers were likely to swallow hook, line, and sinker.
Sutherland had seen clearly the relationship between corporate
greed and blue-collar crime in his opinion for the majority in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital.' If denial of a living wage might
cause women to turn to prostitution, he remarked, it might just
as easily turn men to lives of crime.'97 If they had to invalidate
the minimum wage and price regulation in order to retain the
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goodwill of the business elite, the Horsemen could nevertheless
help those who turned to crime as a result of capitalist selfish-
ness to do so free of punitive consequences. In this way the
necessary costs of their superficially pro-business stance could
be quietly and interstitially spread through a permissive posture
toward crime. And all of this could be done in the name of
liberty.
IV.
While undertaking such vigorous exertions on behalf of the
criminals' lobby, the Horsemen apparently thought it best to
maintain a low profile in cases in which political and religious
mavericks sought the shelter of the First Amendment. Yet even
here one detects a concerted if slippery campaign to frustrate
the conservative agenda. While Van Devanter and McReynolds
had voted to uphold convictions for attempts to obstruct the
draft under the Espionage Act,'98 all Four Horsemen joined the
opinion turning back a government attempt to characterize such
obstruction as a criminal conspiracy to defraud the United
States when the Espionage Act had expired.'" In 1925 they
joined Justice Sanford's opinion in Gitlow v. California'° which,
while upholding Gitlow's conviction for criminal anarchism,
slyly applied the First Amendment's speech and press guaran-
ties against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, thereby facilitating future intervention on
behalf of persecuted dissenters."' This promise was first re-
deemed in 1927 when, while they voted to uphold Communist
Labor Party organizer Anita Whitney's criminal syndicalism
conviction, they joined the very same day an opinion reversing
the criminal syndicalism conviction of an organizer for the In-
dustrial Workers of the World. 3 In 1931 they employed a
slightly different diversionary tactic, with McReynolds' and
Butler"°5 filing token dissents from the reversal of a conviction
for violation of California's law prohibiting the display of red
flags, while Van Devanter and Sutherland silently acquiesced in
Hughes' opinion for the majority.' While the anti-Semitic
McReynolds' and his fellows defended state censorship of a
publication devoted to the defamation of Minneapolis Jews in
Near v. Minnesota,' they voted five years later to strike down
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Louisiana's special tax on newspapers of large circulation in
Grosjean v. American Press Co.' In 1937 they railed against the
reversal of Communist Party organizer Angelo Herndon's con-
viction for incitement to violent insurrection."' Yet that same
term they discreetly voted to overturn the criminal syndicalism
conviction of Party member Dirk De Jonge, who had assisted in
the conduct of a public meeting held under the auspices of the
Party, on the flimsy ground that the troublemaker had advo-
cated no unlawful action at that particular meeting."' While
McReynolds, when the sole remaining Horseman, would vote to
uphold the flag salute requirement challenged in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,..2 he would during the same term vote
to overturn the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for breach of
the peace and soliciting contributions without a license."3 Two
years earlier, when Butler had still ridden at McReynolds' side,
the two remaining Horsemen had similarly joined the opinion
reversing the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for distribution
of pamphlet literature without a license.'
This cagey "Look over there!"/ "Your shoe's untied" strategy
for accommodating political and religious diversity was com-
plemented by a similarly stealthy jurisprudence of multicul-
turalism. McReynolds, perhaps best remembered for his infa-
mously bigoted treatment of his Jewish brethren Brandeis and
Cardozo,"' was joined by Van Devanter and Butler in making
up out of whole cloth a right to receive instruction in modern
foreign languages in Meyer v. Nebraska."6 In Farrington v.
Tokushige.7 each of his fellow Horsemen joined McReynolds'
opinion extending the benefits of that right to aliens in Hawaii
attending schools in which the primary language of instruction
was Japanese. The Horsemen unanimously repelled the mo-
noculturalist Ku Klux Klan's attack on parochial education in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' while Van Devanter, joined by
Sutherland and Butler, wrote the opinion upholding the power
of New York to require the Klan to disclose to the secretary of
state its governing documents, officer roster and membership
list-a requirement from which the Court would shield the
NAACP thirty years later. 9 Van Devanter rejected the Klan's
contention that requiring it to make such disclosure while ex-
cusing labor unions and other oath-bound organizations from
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such revelations denied the Klan equal protection. The classifi-
cation was justified, Van Devanter explained, because the Klan,
unlike labor unions, had a tendency "to make the secrecy sur-
rounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and con-
duct inimical to personal rights and public welfare"; because it
engaged in acts designed "'to strike terror into the minds of the
people"'; because "its membership was limited to native born,
gentile, Protestant whites" and its members took an oath "to
shield and preserve 'white supremacy"'; and because "it was
conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes and
stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices."'' "
America's turn inward after World War I produced a xeno-
phobic immigration policy, and the Four Horsemen cultivated a
correspondingly harsh public posture in the celebrated naturali-
zation cases of the period."' They are perhaps best remembered
for joining Butler's opinion upholding the preposterous denial
of citizenship to forty-nine year old pacifist Rosika Schwimmer
on the ground that she would not swear to take up arms in de-
fense of the United States.' Yet peremptory treatment of such
liberal darlings as Schwimmer, MacIntosh,' and Bland" ' pro-
vided cover for their campaign to subvert the nation's renascent
nativist agenda. Unnoticed and forgotten are obscure cases in
which they intervened on behalf of tired, poor, huddled masses
yearning to breathe free. How many recall Gegiow v. Uhl,' in
which Van Devanter and McReynolds joined the opinion over-
turning the decision of the Commissioner of Immigration, who
had excluded and detained a group of illiterate Russian laborers
on the basis of their ignorance, poverty, and the overstocked
state of the labor market in the city of their destination? Or
White v. Chin Fong,6 the 1920 case in which Van Devanter and
McReynolds repulsed an effort by the Commissioner of Immi-
gration to deny re-entry to a Chinese merchant whom the gov-
ernment alleged had earlier entered the country by means of
fraud? How about Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 7 decided the same
year, in which Van Devanter and McReynolds joined the opin-
ion granting a writ of habeas corpus to a plaintiff claiming un-
lawful detention under the Chinese exclusion laws, and de-
nouncing the investigation into the plaintiff's claim of native
U.S. citizenship as "manifestly unfair"?' Or Cheung Sum Shee
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v. Nagle, 9 in which each of his fellow Horsemen joined McRey-
nolds' opinion denouncing the Secretary of Labor's heartless re-
fusal to admit the alien wives and minor children of resident
Chinese merchants lawfully domiciled in the United States?
Who remembers that McReynolds and Butler joined the opin-
ion in the 1939 case of Perkins v. Elg, ° in which the Court sti-
fled attempts to deport as an illegal alien a woman born in the
United States to Swedish parents who had removed her to Swe-
den and renounced their American citizenship during her mi-
nority? Or the permissive posture struck by Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Sutherland in Hansen v. Haff," in which they
frustrated an attempt to deport a Danish woman who returned
to the United States with the intention of continuing to engage
in illicit sexual relations with a married man, joining the Court's
refusal to characterize her entry as one for an "immoral pur-
pose"? 2 You will perhaps say that this comes as no great sur-
prise, in light of Van Devanter's and McReynolds' perform-
ances in United States v. Lombardo,3 the 1916 case in which
they voted to sustain, on jurisdictional grounds, a demurrer to
the indictment of a defendant charged with harboring an alien
woman in her home for purposes of prostitution.'
Similarly, the votes of Butler and Van Devanter to uphold the
notorious western Alien Land Laws 5 have served to eclipse the
Four Horsemen's quiet interventions on behalf of aliens to
whom various state, local, and territorial governments sought to
deny the right to pursue a lawful calling on terms of equality
with all others. Some may recall that Van Devanter joined
Justice Hughes' opinion in the 1915 case of Truax v. Raich, 6
invalidating an Arizona statute requiring that eighty percent of
an employer's employees be native born citizens or qualified
electors. 7 But how many could recite the facts of Asakura v.
Seattle, 8 in which each of his fellow Horsemen joined Butler's
opinion invalidating a city ordinance denying a Japanese nation-
al a license to engage in the pawnbroking business? Or those of
Jordan v. Tashiro,39 in which all Four Horsemen joined the
Court's opinion invalidating California's attempt to prohibit
Japanese aliens from leasing land and acquiring a corporate
franchise for the purpose of operating a hospital?2" Or those of
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,'" in which all Four Horsemen voted
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to invalidate a law of the Philippine Islands prohibiting merch-
ants from keeping account books in any other than one of three
approved languages? The Court held that the burden this law
placed on a Chinese businessman who was unable to read, write
or understand any of the permitted languages constituted an
arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of liberty and property
without due process and a denial of equal protection."2 These
efforts to establish a beachhead for an alien middle class on
American soil are lost to all but the most tenacious of memories.
V.
Seen against the backdrop of their spadework for big gov-
ernment and the welfare state, their softness on crime and
drugs, their shifty support of political dissent and their surrepti-
tious solicitude for a multicultural America at the height of na-
tional xenophobia, the Horsemen's occasional railings against
the encroachments of the modern regulatory state seem to be
instances of the Justices protesting too much. Their success in
projecting and perpetuating their images as right-wing reaction-
aries not only throughout their careers, but so long after their
deaths, is testimony to their tactical brilliance. They are perhaps
the greatest double agents of the interwar period. Their story is
a reminder to us, as legal historians, of the need for eternal
vigilance. I pray we don't get fooled again.
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come received from a trust which had already been taxed by another state as not
violating the Due Process Clause, with Butler joining McReynolds' opinion); Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938) (favoring interpretation of
commissioner allowing taxation of decedent's partnership interest, with Butler join-
ing opinion) (McReynolds dissents); United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938)
(holding that the statute of limitations for the government to sue to recover tax re-
funds erroneously paid to taxpayer did not begin to run until the refund was actually
paid, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n,
303 U.S. 20 (1938) (per curiam) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion upholding im-
position of state income tax on individuals claiming federal immunity); Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding tax component of National Firearms
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Act and noting that a tax may have a regulatory effect and burden the thing taxed,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); New York ex re. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S.
308 (1937) (holding that a state may tax income of citizens derived from rents on land
situated in another state, with Sutherland and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler
and McReynolds dissent); Taber v. Indian Terr. Illuminating Oil Co., 300 U.S. 1
(1937) (upholding a state tax on company providing oil and gas to Indian allotments
as not infringing on the tax immunity of the federal government, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U.S.
383 (1937) (upholding a federal tax on tobacco products purchased by a state for use
in state hospitals, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds'
opinion); New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937) (expanding state
right to tax non-residents by ruling that intangible property may have a "business si-
tus" in state for tax purposes, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Wainer v.
United States, 299 U.S. 92 (1936) (upholding federal statutes placing tax on the
wholesale liquor business, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Baltimore Nat'l
Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 209 (1936) (upholding state tax on national
bank shares belonging to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as not infringing
on the tax immunity of federal government, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (holding that state and
federal courts can entertain suits to collect tax judgments rendered by the courts of
another state, and that such judgments cannot be denied full faith and credit, with
Van Devanter and Sutherland joining opinion) (Butler and McReynolds dissent);
Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934) (holding that there was no constitutional
requirement that opportunity to contest tax assessment be given before assessment,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Roberts v. Richland Irrig. Dist., 289 U.S. 71
(1933) (upholding irrigation tax district assessment on taxpayer whose payments ex-
ceeded the value of benefits received, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
joining McReynolds' opinion); First Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 289 U.S.
60 (1933) (upholding state tax on certain transactions in national banks against an
Equal Protection Clause challenge, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Burnet
v. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508 (1933) (upholding federal tax on private company
leasing lands for oil and gas excavation from state as not violating immunity of state,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S.
509 (1933) (accepting a state supreme court construction of state tax, and thus refus-
ing to consider a Contracts Clause violation, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van De-
vanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S.
352 (1932) (upholding state system of taxation for use of its public highways that cre-
ated various exceptions as not violating the Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932)
(holding that the Court was bound by a state court decision construing a tax on the
privilege of doing business in state as applied to a corporate receiver, with Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286
U.S. 276 (1932) (declaring that a state has the power to tax its own citizens on their
net incomes though derived wholly from activities conducted outside of state, with
Butler, McReynolds, and Sutherland joining opinion) (Van Devanter dissents in
part); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932) (restricting the power of federal
courts to enjoin the collection of an allegedly unconstitutional state tax where rem-
edy of paying under protest and then suing existed under state law, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931)
(upholding state stamp tax on promissory notes executed within its borders, with all
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Four Horsemen joining opinion); Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57 (1931)
(upholding a state tax and registration law for motor vehicles as it applied to non-
residents as not violative of the Equal Protection Clause, with McReynolds, Suther-
land, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler takes no part); Henrietta Mills v.
Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121 (1930) (disallowing a suit claiming inequality in
taxation because an adequate remedy existed at state law, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929) (striking
down state tax on gasoline purchased out of state and used to power an interstate
ferry as violating the Commerce Clause); St. Louis & S.W. Ry. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157
(1928) (holding that state law authorizing creation of local taxing district did not re-
quire notice to taxpayer to conform with due process, with Butler, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142
(1928) (Sutherland dissents from opinion holding that a state may not tax income re-
ceived from patents issued by federal government); Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927) (holding that notice to taxpayers of special tax assess-
ment listed in a newspaper was sufficient to avoid Due Process Clause violation, with
all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Montana, 268 U.S. 45
(1925) (holding that state had implied consent to tax instrumentality of federal gov-
ernment, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion);
House v. Road Improvement Dist., 266 U.S. 175 (1924) (holding that state road im-
provement tax on property not benefited by such improvement did not violate Four-
teenth Amendment, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds'
opinion); Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 265 U.S. 384 (1924) (holding that state need
not give notice concerning special tax assessment where state courts were open to
provide a means to challenge, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Lacoste v.
Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 45 (1924) (upholding right of state to tax wild
animals taken within border against Commerce Clause challenge, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); McGregor v. Hogan, 263
U.S. 234 (1923) (upholding state tax statute which made assessment first, allowing a
hearing after payment, as not violating Due Process Clause, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Butters v. City of Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923) (holding that mu-
nicipal improvement taxes assessed on those who would receive little benefit did not
violate Fourteenth Amendment, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining
Sutherland's opinion); Thomas v. Kansas City S. Ry., 261 U.S. 481 (1923) (upholding
drainage taxing district, ruling that state decision will survive Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge unless clearly arbitrary and discriminatory, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Valley Farms Co. v. County of Westchester, 261 U.S. 155 (1923)
(holding that state tax for sewer system, which placed tax on those who received no
benefit from project, was valid against Fourteenth Amendment challenge, with But-
ler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923) (holding that retroactive state tax penalties were not
prohibited by constitutional ban on ex post facto laws, with all Four Horsemen join-
ing opinion); United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1923) (upholding a tax on the il-
legal production of alcohol, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Knights v.
Jackson, 260 U.S. 12 (1922) (upholding state tax scheme which levied general state
tax and then returned revenues to municipalities as not violating Fourteenth Amend-
ment, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. Co. v.
Welles, 260 U.S. 8 (1922) (holding that city tax, originally invalid because of lack of
power of municipality to levy tax did not conflict with Due Process Clause once it was
ratified by state legislature, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Fidelity Title &
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Trust Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 304 (1922) (upholding tax on banking surplus
where bank could not demonstrate that its undivided profits were not used as capital,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Heald v. District of Columbia,
259 U.S. 114 (1922) (upholding congressional taxation of D.C. despite lack of repre-
sentation for citizens of D.C., with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Burrill v. Locomobile Co., 258 U.S. 34 (1922) (reversing judgment that awarded
company repayment of erroneous taxes paid because company did not file claim
within statute of limitations, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Breiholz v. Board of Supervisors, 257 U.S. 118 (1921) (Van Devanter joins opinion
upholding drainage district assessment which paid for cleaning and maintenance of
facilities as not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment) (McReynolds concurs in re-
sult); Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589 (1921) (holding that Massachusetts tax scheme
which took more tax money from town than it received in benefits did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 256 U.S. 129 (1921)
(holding that state may tax residents for drainage district without taking into account
actual benefits received, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
upholding North Dakota tax imposed to subsidize private industry against claims that
the expenditures were not for a legitimate public purpose); McGuire v. Trefry, 253
U.S. 12 (1920) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding Massachusetts' taxation of
trust income paid to a Massachusetts beneficiary of a Pennsylvania trust)
(McReynolds dissents); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding New York's taxation of income earned in the state
by nonresidents); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (Van Devanter joins opinion
upholding imposition of Oklahoma tax on income derived from property and busi-
ness situated within the state though owned and managed from outside the state by a
nonresident) (McReynolds dissents); Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454 (1919)
(holding that in levying a sewer district tax, city need not have a hearing to conform
with Due Process where state delegates its taxing power, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919)
(upholding right of city to place a burdensome tax on owners of billboards, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co.,
249 U.S. 63 (1919) (upholding city tax bill for paving road, despite inequalities in as-
sessment and despite lack of public hearing on project, as not violating Fourteenth
Amendment, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); McCurdy v.
United States, 246 U.S. 263 (1918) (affirming right of state to tax land owned by Na-
tive American, against challenge by Secretary of Interior, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (holding
that state tax levied to create a fuel yard for residents did not violate Fourteenth
Amendment, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Seton Hall Col-
lege v. Village of S. Orange, 242 U.S. 100 (1916) (upholding state tax on a university
originally exempted from taxation under state law, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); St. Louis & Kansas City Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U.S.
419 (1916) (upholding municipal tax on widening road as not violating the Due Proc-
ess Clause, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Embree v. Kansas
City Rd. Dist., 240 U.S. 242 (1916) (holding that state taxation to pay for road district
bonds did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, with McReynolds joining Van
Devanter's opinion); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (upholding right of state
to create a drainage taxing district against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, with
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McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Philip Wagner, Inc. v. Leser, 239
U.S. 207 (1915) (holding that state tax placed on property for benefit of having ad-
joining paved road did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, with Van Devanter
joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U.S. 642
(1915) (Van Devanter writes opinion upholding imposition of state tax on individual
claiming federal immunity); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914) (indicating
in answer to a question asked of the Court that a tax on foreign-made vessels in the
use of foreign-built yachts did not violate due process, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914) (indicating in answer to ques-
tions asked of the Court that Congress may place an excise tax on an American citi-
zen using a foreign-made vessel outside of American waters, with Van Devanter
joining opinion); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914) (indicating in answer
to question asked of Court that the excise tax in the Tariff Act of 1909 placed on for-
eign-built yachts was not contrary to the Due Process Clause, with Van Devanter
joining opinion); Dowman v. Texas, 231 U.S. 353 (1913) (upholding state tax on sepa-
rate owners of an estate where title has been severed, with Van Devanter joining
opinion).
13 See, e.g., Helvering v. Kehoe, 309 U.S. 277 (1940) (McReynolds writes opinion
ruling that federal courts cannot overturn Board of Tax Appeals rulings when there
was a substantial basis for their conclusions); Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U.S. 218
(1938) (upholding imposition of federal income tax on individuals claiming immunity,
with Butler joining McReynolds' opinion); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S.
609 (1938) (holding that money received by a corporation by exchange in a reorgani-
zation and turned over to stockholders subject to stockholders' agreement to assume
and pay off indebtedness of the corporation was taxable gain to the corporation, with
Butler and McReynolds joining Sutherland's opinion); United States v. Garbutt Oil
Co., 302 U.S. 528 (1938) (ruling that the addition of a new ground to a pending claim
for a tax refund filed subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations was
barred and that the Commissioner was without power to waive the bar in favor of the
taxpayer, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining opinion); United States v.
Andrews, 302 U.S. 517 (1938) (ruling statute of limitations barred taxpayer's claim
for tax refund, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining opinion); Helvering
v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937) (upholding the taxation of the proceeds received on
sale of a dividend of preferred stock, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Gro-
man v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (affirming an income tax deficiency assess-
ment of the Board of Tax Appeals in face of reversal by court of appeals, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U..S.
216 (1937) (interpreting revenue acts to include as income amounts realized by insur-
ance companies at foreclosure sales, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 37 (1937) (holding that reversal by court of appeals of Board of Tax Appeals
decision which was supported by substantial evidence was unwarranted, with Butler,
Van Devanter and Sutherland joining McReynolds' opinion); United States v. Hud-
son, 299 U.S. 498 (1937) (upholding federal tax on profits realized from sale of silver
bullion as within the taxing power of Congress, with Butler, McReynolds, and Suth-
erland joining Van Devanter's opinion); Schafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171 (1936)
(affirming an income tax deficiency assessment against a stock broker who had used
market value rather than cost value in computing income for taxation of inventories
of securities purchased for his own account, with Butler, Van Devanter and Suther-
land joining McReynolds' opinion); United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting
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Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936) (holding that money received in settlement of a contested
claim for profits was income subject to taxation despite fact that claim arose prior to
passage of Sixteenth Amendment, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Helver-
ing v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (upholding imposition of federal income tax on
salaries of trustees of Boston elevated railway, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (upholding federal taxation of state-run
liquor dispensary system, with Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler joining Suth-
erland's opinion); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (holding that profit from the
sale of municipal bond was distinct from the bond's principal or interest, and thus
taxable, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (holding that an employer's payment of employee's in-
come tax assessment represents additional taxable income to the employee, with
Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Met-
calf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (upholding imposition of federal income
tax on profits of a private contractor from performance of a contract with a state,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422
(1926) (interpreting Revenue Act of 1918 so as to disallow a claimed deduction which
would have allowed taxpayer to defer tax payments one year, with Butler, McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Sutherland dissents); United States v.
Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926) (presuming that a wife, under state property law,
merely held an expectancy interest in husband's property, the Court held the entire
amount of property taxable to the husband, with Butler, McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion) (Sutherland dissents); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925)
(holding that money received under a trust arrangement was income to beneficiary
and taxable, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler and Suth-
erland dissent); United States v. Flannery, 268 U.S. 98 (1925) (McReynolds and
Sutherland dissent from opinion, in which Butler and Van Devanter join, interpreting
Revenue Act of 1918 to mean that taxes can be imposed and losses allowed only
upon an actual gain or loss being suffered); Graham v. du Pont, 262 U.S. 234 (1923)
(rejecting taxpayer challenge of a federal income tax assessment, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.S. 536 (1921) .(Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion upholding taxation of gain realized upon sale of
bonds); Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion upholding taxation of profit from sale of stock held for investment);
Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion upholding taxation of profit from sale of stock by trust);
DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1919) (upholding income tax on investment
property owned by alien non-resident, with Van Devanter joining opinion)
(McReynolds takes no part); Coleman v. United States, 250 U.S. 30 (1919) (holding
that although taxes were erroneously collected, taxpayer could not receive refund be-
cause of statute of limitations, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 (1918) (holding that dividend received was taxable
up to amount gained following the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339
(1918) (ruling that corporate dividends paid to taxpayer following enactment of Six-
teenth Amendment were taxable, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opin-
ion); Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 122 (1916) (holding that federal courts have no juris-
diction over tax disputes unless taxpayer has first paid tax and appealed to
Commissioner of IRS, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no
part); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of provi-
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sions requiring taxpayer to pay taxes before making an appeal to Commissioner of
IRS, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no part).
24 See, e.g., Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358 (1939)
(McReynolds joins opinion upholding imposition of state tax on entity claiming fed-
eral immunity); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313
(1939) (upholding state tax on capital stock of insurance corporation, with Butler
joining the concurrence by Justice Reed) (McReynolds dissents); Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) (holding that fee on cars brought into state for sale did not
violate the Commerce Clause, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Bonet
v. Yabucoa Sugar Co., 306 U.S. 505 (1939) (upholding right of Puerto Rico not to be
sued without its permission in a tax refund case, with Butler and McReynolds joining
opinion); Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72 (1939)
(McReynolds joins Butler's opinion upholding state tax on trucking carriers as not
violative of Commerce Clause); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62
(1939) (Butler joins McReynolds' opinion upholding application of state use tax to
foreign corporation); Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. v. Territory of Hawaii, 305 U.S.
306 (1938) (holding Hawaiian tax on utility not in conflict with federal law, and not in
violation of Commerce Clause, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); J.D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (McReynolds dissents from
opinion holding Indiana income tax an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce); Coverdale v. Arkansas-La. Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938) (Butler joins
opinion upholding Louisiana tax on generating electricity against Commerce Clause
challenge) (McReynolds dissents); N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York,
303 U.S. 573 (1938) (holding tax on utilities doing business in city not violative of
Fourteenth Amendment, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938) (McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler
join opinion upholding state taxation of trust company); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Virginia,
302 U.S. 22 (1937) (Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland join opinion upholding Vir-
ginia licensing fee on foreign corporations doing business in state as not violating
Commerce Clause); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937)
(Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter join Sutherland's opinion upholding tax on
domestic processing of coconut oil as not violating due process); First Bank Stock
Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937) (Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland
join opinion upholding state taxation of foreign corporation) (Butler takes no part);
Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) (upholding state franchise
tax on foreign corporations, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (upholding state tax on sale of chattels brought
into state in interstate commerce as not violating Commerce Clause, with Sutherland
and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler and McReynolds dissent); State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Marker Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (upholding the power of
state to exact a license fee for the privilege of importing beer from other state as not
violating the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses, with Van Devanter, McRey-
nolds and Sutherland joining opinion) (Butler concurs in the result); Barwise v.
Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936) (Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland join Van Devan-
ter's opinion upholding state excise tax placed on the royalty interest of lessor and
lessee in oil production as not violating Fourteenth Amendment); Atlantic Lumber
Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation, 298 U.S. 553 (1936) (upholding state
privilege tax on corporation whose head office was in state, with Butler, McReynolds
and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407
(1936) (upholding state tax on the privilege of using public highways for commercial
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purposes, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298
U.S. 193 (1936) (holding that state may tax property of corporation incorporated in
another state but having a situs in the taxing state, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936)
(holding that state tax on railroad income did not violate Commerce Clause where
state used a reasonable method to arrive at in-state earnings, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U.S. 620 (holding that state
did not violate due process by assessing paving costs on street railway without regard
to benefit received, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McReynolds'
opinion); Matson Nay. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936) (holding
that state may lay a privilege tax on corporation involved in interstate commerce,
with McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Pacific
Ttl. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936) (upholding state tax levied on
foreign common carrier for privilege of doing local business, measured by gross in-
come of business, as not violating Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261
(1935) (upholding state harbor fee exaction, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935)
(upholding state license tax on private carriers operating motor vehicles for hire as
not violating the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935)
(upholding state tax on gasoline sold or delivered by distributors as not violating
Commerce Clause, with McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining Butler's
opinion); Detroit Int'l Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Bd., 294 U.S. 83 (1935)
(upholding a state tax on the operators of a toll bridge spanning Canadian border,
with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Old Mis-
sion Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289 (1934) (disallowing deductions
of bond discounts when the underlying transaction was between two affiliated com-
panies, with McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler dis-
sents); Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934) (upholding state prop-
erty tax on corporation's property in state but employed in interstate commerce as
not violating Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Healy v.
Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934) (holding that challenger of a state license tax did not meet
the amount in controversy requirement necessary to question the law in federal
court, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292
U.S. 86 (1934) (upholding state gasoline tax placed on importer as not violating
Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Magnano Co. v. Hamil-
ton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding state tax on butter substitutes as not violating
Commerce Clause, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's
opinion); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934) (holding
that city tax on private corporation, with which the city was a direct competitor, did
not violate Fourteenth Amendment) (McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler concur in
Van Devanter's specially concurring opinion); Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291
U.S. 584 (1934) (upholding a state occupation tax on cotton trading business as not
violating Commerce Clause even though cotton would be shipped out of state, with
all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S.
466 (1934) (Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland join Butler's opinion up-
holding imposition of state excise tax on business claiming federal immunity); Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 300 (1934) (upholding city license tax on tele-
phone company with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Federal Compress &
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Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) (holding a state tax on storing and
compressing cotton did not violate Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen join-
ing opinion); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933) (upholding state's taxation of
cattle bought in another state and held briefly before resale, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transp., Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933) (holding
state tax on airline fuel used in interstate transportation did not violate Commerce
Clause, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining opinion) (Van Devanter
takes no part); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) (holding
state privilege tax on railway carrier's storage and withdrawal of gasoline from tanks
did not violate Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four Horse-
men joining opinion); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 288 U.S. 181 (1933)
(holding that tax which distinguished between commercial bankers and mere lenders
did not violate Equal Protection Clause, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter
joining McReynolds' opinion); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178 (1933)
(holding state tax on producers using water and steam to produce electricity did not
violate Equal Protection Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Detroit
Int'l Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Bd., 287 U.S. 338 (1932) (upholding state
tax previously struck down by Court because re-computation brought tax within
Fourteenth Amendment requirements, with McReynolds, Sutherland and Van De-
vanter joining Butler's opinion); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932)
(holding state gasoline tax on gas stored for future use within state did not violate
Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Continental Baking Co.
v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932) (upholding state scheme for taxation and regulation
of commercial motor carriers, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Utah Power
& Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (holding that state can tax electric genera-
tion without violating the Commerce Clause, despite the fact that interstate and in-
trastate generation were inseparable, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining Sutherland's opinion); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (holding
that revenue from copyrights issued by federal government were not exempt from
state taxation because of federal government tax immunity, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 (1932) (McReynolds joins
opinion upholding a state tax on revenue from bonds exempted from state taxation at
time of purchase) (Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter dissent); Eastern Air
Transp., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932) (holding state tax
on fuel supplied to airplanes traveling in interstate commerce did not violate Com-
merce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Southern Ry. v. Kentucky,
284 U.S. 338 (1932) (upholding state tax previously struck down by Court because re-
computation brought tax within Fourteenth Amendment requirements, with McRey-
nolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Phillips v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (holding that taxpayers who have
received the assets of a dissolved corporation may be compelled to discharge the cor-
poration's unpaid taxes, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); East Ohio Gas Co.
v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931) (holding a state tax on natural gas did not vio-
late the Commerce Clause, with McReynolds, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining
Butler's opinion); Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 297 (1931)
(holding that as a general rule tax exemptions of one government must be construed
so as not to unduly impair the taxing power of another government, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279 (1931)
(upholding federal tax on oil sales, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Inter-
state Transit Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 191 (1931) (McReynolds dissents from
1997] The Four Horsemen 595
opinion striking down as violating the Commerce Clause a state privilege tax on
automobiles exclusively engaged in interstate commerce); Alward v. Johnson, 282
U.S. 509 (1931) (holding special tax on automobiles used in stage line did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McRey-
nolds' opinion); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931) (McReynolds
joins opinion upholding a state tax including in income royalties received from copy-
rights obtained under federal law as not infringing tax immunity of federal govern-
ment); Memphis & C. Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241 (1931) (Butler, McReynolds and
Sutherland join Van Devanter's opinion holding that reasonable, nonarbitrary road
district tax on railroad did not violate Fourteenth Amendment); Klein v. Board of
Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19 (1930) (holding that state tax scheme in which share-
holders were not taxed if corporation has at least 75% of property in state did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); West-
ern Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U.S. 511 (1930) (McReynolds, Sutherland and
Van Devanter join Butler's opinion holding a state tax on corporation's mail order
business did not violate Commerce Clause); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146,
159 (1930) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment grants no "iron rule of equality"
of taxation in upholding state tax on petroleum, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930) (holding
that parties cannot convert a local business into an interstate business through pre-
tense of contract to avoid state taxation, with McReynolds and Sutherland joining
opinion) (Butler and Van Devanter dissent); Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U.S. 80
(1929) (holding that state tax on freight carriers which distinguished between those
that operate on regular routes and others did not violate Equal Protection Clause,
with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Williams v.
Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929) (holding that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge
state gasoline tax on the basis of Fourteenth Amendment violations, with Sutherland
joining McReynolds' opinion) (Van Devanter and Butler concur, arguing taxpayers
did have standing, but that tax was valid); White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas ex
rel. Applegate, 279 U.S. 692 (1929) (holding state collection of back taxes on corpo-
rations previously undertaxed did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, with
McReynolds and Sutherland joining opinion) (Butler and Van Devanter dissent); In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 429 (1929) (holding a local franchise tax
which included property used in interstate commerce in its computation did not vio-
late Commerce Clause, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining opinion)
(McReynolds dissents); New York v. Latrobe, 279 U.S. 421 (1929) (Sutherland and
Van Devanter join opinion holding state franchise tax charging different rates for dif-
ferent kinds of stock did not violate Fourteenth Amendment) (Butler and McRey-
nolds concur in the result); Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929) (Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter join McReynolds' opinion holding that state license
tax on buying oysters did not violate Commerce Clause); Helson & Randolph v. Ken-
tucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929) (McReynolds dissents from opinion invalidating state
gasoline tax); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 109 (1929) (McReynolds
dissents from the opinion striking down state tax on gasoline passing through state as
violative of Commerce Clause); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929)
(upholding state tax on railroad property which took into account property used in
interstate commerce, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter joining Suther-
land's opinion); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S. 499 (1929) (holding that state
can tax both use and sale of gasoline imported into state, that comes to rest in state,
without violating the Commerce Clause, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter
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joining Sutherland's opinion); National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts, 277 U.S. 413
(1928) (upholding state tax on foreign corporations, with Van Devanter, Sutherland
and Butler joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi
ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (McReynolds dissents from opinion holding that
state tax on gasoline was unconstitutional as it applies to sales to federal government
instrumentalities); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion holding state tax charged per mile on busses traveling on
state highways not violative of the Commerce Clause); Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacIn-
erney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928) (holding state license tax on imported fish did not violate
Commerce Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S.
554 (1927) (holding that state requirement that common carriers obtain a permit and
pay a tax to help maintain highways did not violate Commerce Clause, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927)
(holding state tax on natural gas produced within state did not violate Commerce
Clause, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion);
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U.S. 407 (1927) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment
does not require uniform taxation or forbid double taxation, while upholding a fran-
chise tax on petroleum producer, which also paid general property tax, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 615 (1926)
(McReynolds dissents from opinion restraining imposition of state tax on business
claiming federal immunity); Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U.S. 577
(1926) (upholding state mining tax against Equal Protection, Due Process, and Con-
tracts Clause challenges, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining McRey-
nolds' opinion); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v, Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50 (1926) (holding
that state franchise tax on capital stock did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270
U.S. 367 (1926) (holding state tax on rolling-stock of non-resident corporation did
not violate the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Pacific Am. Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U.S. 269 (1925)
(upholding a graduated state tax on cases of fish, which encouraged preservation and
discriminated against large canneries, as not violative of Fifth Amendment, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Ray Consol. Copper Co. v. United States, 268 U.S.
373 (1925) (giving IRS discretion to prescribe the method for ascertaining the value
of a corporation's capital stock, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion) (Sutherland dissents); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. City of Parkersburg, 268 U.S.
35 (1925) (holding that Court lacked jurisdiction to uphold a railroad's municipal tax
exemption, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267
U.S. 442 (1924) (holding congressional power to assess discriminatory taxes against a
corporation was consistent with the Fifth Amendment so long as distinctions were
reasonable, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Road Im-
provement Dist. No. 3,266 U.S. 379 (1924) (holding that a state act requiring the cost
of road improvements to be distributed according to the benefits received did not
violate Fourteenth Amendment, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining
Van Devanter's opinion); National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373 (1924)
(upholding taxation on domestic corporation despite contention that Congress vio-
lated Fifth Amendment by exempting foreign competitors, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924)
(holding that a foreign taxpayer taxed in state must first exhaust state remedy before
district court can have jurisdiction, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) (reaffirming right
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of state to tax foreign corporation for business done within state as not violating Due
Process or Commerce Clauses, with Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter joining
opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Chicago Gt. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94 (1924)
(refusing to enjoin enforcement of tax merely because of mistake in valuation, with
all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Southeastern Express Co. v. Robertson, 264
U.S. 535 (1924) (holding state tax which taxes similar industries differently, and
which allows no opportunity for company to be heard regarding taxing scheme, did
not violate Equal Protection Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); First
Nat'l Bank of Greely v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450 (1924) (holding that
national bank cannot raise suit against state tax in federal court without first availing
itself of state process, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter joining Suther-
land's opinion); J.E. Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, 264 U.S. 157 (1924) (upholding
state tax on intrastate activity of brokers and merchants who perform most of their
work in interstate commerce, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
Sutherland's opinion); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924) (upholding
state tax on gasoline which state believed should be used in state as not violating due
process, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
County of King, 264 U.S. 22 (1924) (upholding state tax on streetcar company against
equal protection challenge, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Baker v. Drue-
sedow, 263 U.S. 137 (1923) (holding that a state may tax railroads differently from
other businesses without violating Due Process Clause, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923)
(allowing state taxation of national banks, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland
joining Van Devanter's opinion); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923) (holding
that state tax on corporation did not violate Commerce Clause because state at-
tempted to tax only the business conducted in state, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923) (upholding state occupa-
tion tax on goods previously shipped into state and held in storage, with Butler, Suth-
erland and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds concurs, arguing that Court
should firmly state that interstate commerce ends when package reaches consignee);
Atlantic Coast L.R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923) (upholding power of state to
tax the net income of property used in interstate commerce, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923) (Butler, McRey-
nolds and Sutherland join Van Devanter's opinion upholding state taxation of prop-
erty held by interstate businesses in state); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923) (holding that state may tax mining of ore because mining was not inter-
state commerce, with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining Van Devanter's
opinion); Durham Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Durham, 261 U.S. 149 (1923) (Van De-
vanter, Sutherland and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding assessment
against street railway company for paving portions of the street occupied by its
tracks); Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519 (1923) (holding that state tax system,
which assessed railroads differently from other taxpayers, did not violate Fourteenth
Amendment, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (holding that state tax which taxes different kinds of coal dif-
ferently did not violate Fourteenth Amendment, with McReynolds, Sutherland and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922) (upholding
state oil and gasoline tax applied to local transactions, with Van Devanter and
McReynolds joining opinion); Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290
(1922) (upholding state statute taxing capital stock of business even though it took
into account a minor portion of company's interstate business revenue, with McRey-
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nolds concurring) (Van Devanter dissents); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm,
258 U.S. 122 (1922) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding dis-
missal of bill seeking to enjoin enforcement of state tax on toll bridge because com-
pany did not avail itself of state protesting procedures); Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co.,
257 U.S. 226 (1921) (holding that Congress had power to consent to Philippine export
tax, with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Citizens Nat'l Bank of Cin-
cinnati v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99 (1921) (holding state property tax on membership in New
York Stock Exchange did not violate the Equal Protection or Commerce Clauses)
(McReynolds and Van Devanter concur, but express doubt whether membership ap-
parently localized in New York was a taxable property right in Ohio); Bowman v.
Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921) (holding local tax on the sale and distribu-
tion of gasoline did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Choctaw & G.R.R. v. Mackey, 256
U.S. 531 (1921) (holding that railroad property was liable to state assessment for road
improvements, despite claim that railroad was a federal instrumentality because it
had congressional consent to develop coal fields, with McReynolds and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); United States v. American Chicle Co., 256 U.S. 446 (1921)
(upholding state stamp tax on commodities manufactured, sold or removed for sale,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); St. Louis & E. St. L. Elec. Ry.
v. Missouri, 256 U.S. 314 (1921) (holding Missouri tax on street railway operating be-
tween two states did not violate the Commerce Clause, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Middlekamp, 256 U.S. 226 (1921)
(holding Missouri franchise tax on domestic corporations did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); Eldorado Coal & Mining Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522 (1921) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion sustaining taxation of profit realized by sale
of company's mine and plant); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Fremont, 255 U.S. 124
(1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding city license tax on
telegraph company against Commerce Clause challenge); Alaska Fish Salting & By-
Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion upholding license tax on manufacture of fish products not used for consump-
tion); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (Van Devan-
ter and McReynolds join opinion upholding imposition of Connecticut state tax on
portion of Delaware corporation's income earned in Connecticut against Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment challenges); Troy U.R.R. v. Mealy, 254 U.S. 47
(1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding revocation of a busi-
ness tax exemption against Contracts Clause challenge); Cream of Wheat Co. v.
County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion upholding application of South Dakota tax to the stock of a South Dakota
corporation doing no business within the state and having a permanent situs else-
where, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double taxation);
Forged Steel Wheel Co. v. Lewellyn, 251 U.S. 511 (1920) (upholding Munitions Tax
Act against companies that provide components for finished products, with McRey-
nolds joining opinion) (Van Devanter dissents); Worth Bros. Co. v. Lederer, 251 U.S.
507 (1920) (upholding Munitions Tax Act against challenge by companies that pro-
vide components from finished products, with McReynolds joining opinion) (Van
Devanter dissents); Carbon Steel Co. v. Lewellyn, 251 U.S. 501 (1920) (upholding
Munitions Tax Act against challenge by companies who provide components of fin-
ished products, with McReynolds joining opinion) (Van Devanter dissents); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920) (upholding tax on premiums col-
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lected by corporation, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Branson
v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182 (1919) (holding tax on property of railroad for use in repairing
highways did not violate Fourteenth Amendment, with Van Devanter joining opin-
ion); Oklahoma Ry. v. Severns Paving Co., 251 U.S. 104 (1919) (Van Devanter joins
McReynolds' opinion affirming city tax on street rail company for pavement of street
surrounding right of way); Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919)
(upholding municipal license tax on company that sells goods to businesses of other
state because acting as an itinerant vendor, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919)
(upholding St. Louis license tax giving company a right to manufacture within city
against Commerce Clause challenge, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919) (holding
that a city tax on poles and wires maintained by company did not violate Commerce
or Equal Protection Clauses, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919) (holding that local tax
on telegraph company which exceeds net returns from local business did not violate
Commerce Clause, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); G.S.
Nichoas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919) (giving liberal interpretation to
tariff law placing extra duty of foreign products whose tariff costs were subsidized by
the exporter's government, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U.S. 165 (1918) (holding state tax on the property
of a foreign express company held within state did not violate Commerce Clause,
with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town-
ship of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918) (holding that individual claiming discrimina-
tion under Fourteenth Amendment in tax case must prove bad faith, with Van De-
vanter joining McReynolds' opinion); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321 (1918) (holding state computation of income derived from interstate
commerce in computing domestic corporation tax not violative of Commerce Clause,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); United States v. Cleveland, C.,
Chi. & St. L. Ry., 247 U.S. 195 (1918) (holding that company investment, entered into
before tax enactment, could be taxed according to accrual since enactment, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Hays v. Gauley Mtn. Coal Co., 247
U.S. 189 (1918) (holding that company investment, entered into before tax enact-
ment, could be taxed according to accrual since enactment, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918)
(McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion holding state tax on export company did
not violate Commerce Clause); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247
U.S. 132 (1918) (holding state tax on insurance company for doing business in state
not a burden on interstate commerce, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U.S. 116 (1918) (holding that
mining company cannot deduct moneys used to acquire mining rights, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246
U.S. 500 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding state tax on
foreign corporation which installed railroad signals in state); Dalton Adding Mach.
Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 498 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion,
holding that a foreign corporation was involved in intrastate activity and therefore
subject to state licensing power); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450
(1918) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion upholding state tax placed on
freight transportation conducted within state did not violate Commerce Clause);
Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, 246 U.S. 391 (1918) (holding that money
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taken by utility in excess of board order while awaiting outcome of litigation was tax-
able under state law, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Cheney
Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's
opinion upholding Massachusetts tax on out-of-state businesses deemed to have op-
erating branches in state); Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1 (1918) (upholding
right of Virginia to tax out-of-state merchandise sold in state, while granting license
tax exemption to merchandise manufactured in Virginia and sold at point of manu-
facture, as not violative of Fourteenth Amendment, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U.S.
54 (1917) (upholding tax on bank accounts of Kentucky resident, which were previ-
ously taxed in Missouri, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
McCoach v. Insurance Co. of N. Amer., 244 U.S. 585 (1917) (holding that insurance
company reserve fund, not necessitated by state law, cannot be deducted from in-
come, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Five Per
Cent. Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97 (1917) (overruling decision of Court of Customs
Appeals allowing tariff discounts because of trade agreements with other countries,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Von Baumbach v. Sargent
Land Co., 242 U.S. 503 (1917) (holding that value of ore taken from mine not de-
ductible as depreciation of land, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds
takes no part); Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916) (holding that
state tax on stock of company consolidated under state law, but held in another state,
did not violate Commerce Clause, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916) (affirming conviction of coupon
book merchant for failing to pay license tax, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916) (upholding
state business license tax on companies advertising through coupons despite claim
that it would be an undue burden on commerce, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); Lusk v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 236 (1916) (holding that tax on Missouri
corporation doing business in Kansas did not violate Commerce or Due Process
Clauses, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Kansas City, F.S. &
M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227 (1916) (holding that state tax on corporation created
under state law did not violate Commerce Clause, with McReynolds and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916) (holding that
state treatment of board of trade memberships as property of members did not vio-
late the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, with Van Devanter joining opin-
ion); Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115 (1916) (upholding the Tariff Act of
1913 as not violating the Sixteenth Amendment or the general taxing power of Con-
gress, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (holding that Income Tax Law of 1913 applied
to mining corporations, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no
part); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (upholding Tariff Act of 1913,
while limiting taxation uniformity requirement of the Constitution to geographical
uniformity only, with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Morris Canal
& Banking Co. v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126 (1915) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds opin-
ion holding that tax exemption for canal company did not pass with transfer of prop-
erty); Equitable Life Ass'r. Soc'y v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143 (1915) (holding Penn-
sylvania tax on foreign corporation's intrastate insurance receipts did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
United States v. Sherman & Sons Co., 237 U.S. 146 (1915) (holding that importer
must pay duty on goods upon importation in order to have a right to protest against
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duty, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Wright v.
Louisville & Nash. R.R., 236 U.S. 687, 691 (1915) (McReynolds dissents from opinion
holding that lessee was exempt from paying tax because of tax exemption of lessor);
Wright v. Central of Ga. Ry., 236 U.S. 674, 687 (1915) (McReynolds dissents from
opinion holding that because of tax exemption of lessor, lessee was exempt from
paying state tax on property); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914)
(upholding state franchise tax, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds
takes no part); Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914) (holding state statute im-
posing tax on sleeping car companies did not violate Fourteenth Amendment, with
Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brick-
eli, 233 U.S. 304 (1914) (holding that foreign corporation selling sewing machines in
each county of state was subject to state license tax, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914) (ruling that parties may
not convert a local business into an interstate business to avoid state tax through a
non-essential contract, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Ohio River & W. Ry. Co.
v. Dittey, 232 U.S. 576 (1914) (upholding Ohio excise tax on intrastate earnings of
railroad companies, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Stratton's Independence,
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913) (extending Corporation Tax Law of 1909 to
mining corporations, with Van Devanter joining opinion); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U.S. 394 (1913) (holding license tax on businesses having
representatives in state engaged in creating credit reports did not violate Commerce
Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Citizens' Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322
(1913) (holding state tax on telephone corporations, exempting small companies, did
not violate Fourteenth Amendment, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913) (holding municipal license fee based on
cost of theater admission did not violate Equal Protection Clause where revenue was
not taken into account, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Bacon v. Illinois, 227
U.S. 504 (1913) (holding that state tax on goods brought by state citizen from out of
state did not violate Commerce Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Bradley
v. City of Richmond, 227 U.S. 477 (1913) (upholding state law authorizing municipal
license tax on business, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Ewing v. City of Leav-
enworth, 226 U.S. 464 (1913) (holding that a city license tax on package delivery
within a state, which required travel in another state to reach destination, did not
violate Commerce Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Darnell v. Indiana,
226 U.S. 390 (1912) (holding that Indiana tax placed on shares of a foreign corpora-
tion did not violate the Commerce Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911) (holding imposition of state
sales tax did not violate Commerce Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911) (holding that a steamship owned
by a Kentucky corporation, which did not travel to Kentucky, had a tax situs in Ken-
tucky, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1911) (upholding imposition of the federal corporation tax, with Van Devanter
joining opinion).
"- See, e.g., Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935) (all Four Horsemen join opinion
holding federal courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin collection of state inheritance tax);
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds and Sutherland join Butler opinion upholding imposition of state inheri-
tance tax on tangible personalty situated within the state but owned by a decedent
domiciled elsewhere); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds and Sutherland join opinion upholding imposition of federal estate tax
602 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:559
on property situated in the United States and owned by a nonresident alien dece-
dent) (Butler dissents); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion upholding imposition of federal gift tax to assets of a
revocable trust upon settlor's release of the power to revoke) (Butler and Sutherland
dissent); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (McReynolds joins opinion up-
holding various provisions of the federal gift tax against claims that they impose di-
rect taxes requiring apportionment, lack requisite uniformity, and violate the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause) (Van Devanter and Butler concur in Sutherland's
dissent); Salomon v. State Tax Comm'n, 278 U.S. 484 (1929) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion upholding state scheme for taxing inheritance against due process and equal
protection challenges); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929) (Van
Devanter joins opinion rejecting Fifth Amendment and direct tax challenges to impo-
sition of federal estate tax on proceeds of a life insurance policy) (McReynolds con-
curs in the result) (Sutherland and Butler dissent); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1
(1928) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding imposition of state succession tax
on intangible personalty located outside the state of the decedent's domicile); Salton-
stall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260 (1928) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding
state succession tax against due process challenge); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S.
473 (1925) (McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler join Van Devanter's opinion up-
holding provision of Pennsylvania inheritance tax denying deduction for federal es-
tate taxes paid); Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137 (1925) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion upholding a state inheritance tax system resulting in a much larger propor-
tionate tax on larger estates against contentions that it worked a taking of property
without due process and denied equal protection); Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384
(1922) (holding that Congress has power to include municipal bonds in the determi-
nation of value of estate for payment of inheritance taxes, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Kahn v. United States, 257 U.S. 244 (1921) (upholding
assessment of inheritance tax against assignee because refund statute had not passed
at time of transfer, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
upholding federal estate tax against Tenth Amendment and apportionment chal-
lenges); Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122 (1920) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion upholding special state inheritance tax on certain securities
against equal protection challenge); Petersen v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170 (1917) (Van De-
vanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding imposition of state inheritance tax,
which taxed legacies to nonresident aliens at a higher rate than those to state resi-
dents, against the claim that such imposition with respect to legacies to citizens of
Denmark violated a treaty between the United States and that nation); Duus v.
Brown, 245 U.S. 176 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion involving
legacies to citizens of Sweden, and to the same effect); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S.
625 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding power of Wiscon-
sin to impose inheritance tax on the corpus of trust revocable by a Wisconsin dece-
dent yet situated in Illinois, notwithstanding Illinois' imposition of an inheritance tax
on the same property and Wisconsin's failure to credit the amount of the Illinois tax
against the amount owed to Wisconsin); Keeney v. Comptroller of New York, 222
U.S. 525 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding imposition of graduated tax
on transfer of property by deed of trust to take effect at death against due process
and equal protection challenges).
'273 U.S. 12 (1927).
27 Id. at 16.
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Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
2Bruce Allan Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political
Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices 166 (1982) (citations omitted).
'1 5 Letters of Louis D. Brandeis 520, 523, 526-27 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W.
Levy eds., 1978); Murphy, supra note 29, at 166-78; Lewis J. Paper, Brandeis 354-57
(1983); Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People 386-87 (1984);
Melvin I. Urofsky, A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and American Reform 131 (1971);
David J. Danelski, The Propriety of Brandeis' Extrajudicial Conduct, in Brandeis and
America 11, 26-27 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989); Nelson L. Dawson, Brandeis and
the New Deal, in Brandeis and America, supra, at 38, 48 (Nelson L. Dawson, ed.,
1989); Thomas H. Eliot, The Advent of Social Security, in The Making of the New
Deal 150, 159, 160-61 (Katie Louchheim ed., 1983); Paul Freund, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, in Mr. Justice 177, 190 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1964); Let-
ters from Elizabeth B. Raushenbush to Justice Louis D. Brandeis (Sept. 20, 1933;
Sept. 24, 1933; Feb. 5, 1934; Feb. 12, 1934; Feb. 15, 1934) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
-" See 79 Cong. Rec. 9287 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner); Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 557, 559 (oral argument of Charles Wyzanski); Id. at 562, 564
(oral argument of Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson).
,2301 U.S. 548, 591-92 (1937).
'Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
301 U.S. at 613-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Id. at 609 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Id. at 609-10 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 610 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
19 See id. at 598 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 616 (Butler, J., dissenting);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 646 (McReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissenting).
'9262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Id. at 485-86. Sutherland disposed of the claim of unequal taxation in similar
fashion. "But what burden is imposed upon the States, unequally or otherwise? Cer-
tainly there is none, unless it be the burden of taxation, and that falls upon their in-
habitants, who are within the taxing power of Congress as well as that of the States
where they reside." Id. at 482.
-, Id. at 483.
42 Id. at 480.
41 Id. at 483.
Id. at 482. It was apparently this feature of the old-age provisions of the Social
Security Act that secured the votes of Van Devanter and Sutherland in Helvering v.
Davis. See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 609, 612 (Sutherland and Van Devanter, JJ.,
dissenting).
45 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-89.
Id. at 487.
41 Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 184 (1967).
4 Swisher, supra note 2, at 838. See also Paschal, supra note 13, at 212 (arguing that
Sutherland's "great opinion" was his effective liberation of Congress' spending power
announced in Mellon).
4' Wright, supra note 47, at 184.
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10 Edward S. Corwin, Twilight of the Supreme Court 176 (1934). See also Samuel J.
Konefsky, Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court 102 n.1l (1945) (distinguishing
Butler from Mellon:
[W]hile the interest of the federal taxpayer in the general funds of the treasury
is too indefinite for him to be able to question the constitutionality of a par-
ticular expenditure, the interest of those subject to an 'earmarked' tax was suf-
ficiently definite to give them standing to question the expenditure for a pur-
pose said to be forbidden by the Constitution.");
Swisher, supra note 2, at 838-39 ("Congress, therefore, continued to make appropria-
tions of this kind, largely immune from judicial scrutiny.").
s' Corwin, supra note 50, at 183.
Wright, supra note 47, at 184. For cases in which the Court rejected challenges to
New Deal initiatives on standing grounds, see, e.g., Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1,
6 (1937) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion denying defendant standing to chal-
lenge the constitutional authority of Congress to create the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (McReynolds and
Butler join Sutherland's opinion relying on Massachusetts v. Mellon in denying a
power company standing to challenge grants and loans made by the Emergency Re-
lief Administration of Public Works to assist in the construction of electrical distribu-
tion systems); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485 (1938) (same);
California Water Serv. Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938) (per curiam) (relying on
Alabama Power Co.). For instances in which the Court upheld the constitutionality
of New Deal spending programs (in addition to Social Security) see, e.g., Pittman v.
Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 28 (1939) (McReynolds joins opinion as-
suming constitutionality of Home Owners' Loan Corporation); Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 492 (1939) (Butler and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting)
(McReynolds and Butler apparently assuming constitutionality of Home Owners'
Loan Corporation). For examples of the Court allowing lower court decisions sus-
taining the constitutionality of such programs to stand, see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Hander v. Hill, 90 F.2d 573 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736, reh'g. denied, 302
U.S. 779 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of Home Owners' Loan Corporation);
City of Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir., 1934), cert. de-
nied, 293 U.S. 586 (1934) (relying on Massachusetts v. Mellon in holding that power
company has no right as either a federal or a state taxpayer to question the constitu-
tionality of the Public Works Administration). For cases in which lower courts re-
jected challenges to New Deal spending on standing grounds, see, e.g., Arkansas-Mo.
Power Co. v. City of Kennett, 78 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir., 1935) (relying on Mellon in
upholding constitutionality of loans and grants by Public Works Administration);
Iowa S. Util. Co. v. Town of Lamoni, 11 F. Supp. 581, 585 (S.D. Iowa, 1935) (relying
on Mellon to deny company standing to question the constitutionality of loans and
grants made by the Public Works Administration); Graff v. Town of Seward, 9
Alaska 205, 220-21 (1937) (denying plaintiff standing to challenge Public Works Ad-
ministration). Perhaps because of the Mellon doctrine, a vast array of New Deal
spending programs, all financed from general revenue, never underwent constitu-
tional challenge before the Court during the Four Horsemen's tenures. See, e.g., the
Civilian Conservation Corps, 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933), the Federal Emergency Relief
Act, 48 Stat.-55, 56 (1933), the Farm Credit Act, 48 Stat. 257, 258 (1933), the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, 49 Stat. 1, 4 (1935), the Rural Electrification Admini-
stration Act, 49 Stat. 1363, 1364 (1936), and the Emergency Relief Appropriation
Act, 49 Stat. 1597, 1608 (1936).
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--' See Paschal, supra note 13, at 149-52.
- See Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensi-
bility, Part I, 90 Am. Hist. Rev. 339 (1985).
I might be making this up, but I'm sure it's true on some deep, metaphorical level.
5 See, e.g., Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940)
(removing an injunction against state law placing regulations on citrus growers, with
McReynolds joining opinion); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939)
(McReynolds writes opinion upholding state statute requiring liquor to be trans-
ported only by licensed common carriers) (Butler takes no part); Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939) (upholding state regulation of truck drivers, with
McReynolds joining Butler's opinion); South Carolina State Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding state's highway safety statute preventing cer-
tain truck transportation from entering state, with Butler and McReynolds joining
opinion); National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937) (Van Devanter,
Sutherland and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding state labeling law);
Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1937) (rejecting the argument that a
plan to reduce teachers' pay violated Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four Horse-
men joining opinion); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937) (upholding
state regulation of natural gas, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Hauge v.
Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937) (upholding city ordinance requiring commodities sold in
city to be weighed within city, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
McReynolds' opinion); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183 (1936) (upholding state price regulation of commodities sold under trade-
marks, with Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion);
Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936) (upholding state law placing fee on cars
transported in caravans for sale within state, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226 (1936) (recognizing that a
state may grant licenses to sell beer only to state residents, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Illinois ex. rel. McLaughlin, 298
U.S. 155 (1936) (upholding state regulation of farm produce commission merchants,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936)
(upholding state law preventing the sale of convict-made goods, with Butler joining
Sutherland's opinion) (McReynolds and Van Devanter concur in the result); Bayside
Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936) (upholding state regulation of sardine
processing, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opin-
ion); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Havemeyer, 296 U.S. 506 (1936) (upholding Puerto Ri-
can decision to revoke irrigation franchise to a private business, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Clyde Mallory Lines v. Ala-
bama ex rel. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261 (1935) (upholding state harbor
regulations to insure safety of vessels, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Pa-
cific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1935) (upholding state
regulation of containers used to store horticulture products, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 32, 39 (1935) (upholding state
banking law allowing state to take over "unsafe or unsound" banks, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs., 294 U.S.
608 (1935) (upholding state regulation of dental advertising, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335 (1934) (interpreting
state law to require payment to disabled individual, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1934) (limiting the right of
owner to challenge a street improvement project, with all Four Horsemen joining
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opinion); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934) (upholding state man-
dated extra damage awards against insurance company that delayed life insurance
payment in good faith, with McReynolds joining opinion) (Butler, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter dissent in part); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. N.D. Nelson Mfg.
Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934) (upholding state statute requiring insurance on laborers,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934)
(denying suit on justiciability grounds by one state against another because state re-
fused to allow into market products made by prisoners, with McReynolds, Suther-
land, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S.
326 (1933) (upholding state law giving governor plenary power over all state banks,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933)
(upholding fees placed on private contract carriers for use of state highways, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933)
(upholding power of state to require certification of imported cattle to prevent the
spread of infectious disease, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
Butler's opinion); Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933) (upholding city ordi-
nance requiring payment of bond in order to drill for gas or oil in city, with Butler,
McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); C.A. Bradley v. Pub-
lic Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (upholding right of state to deny access of roads
to motor carrier, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Dickson v. Uhlmann
Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933) (upholding state law outlawing certain commodity
trading practices, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion)
(Butler dissents); Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932)
(upholding state statute granting purchaser of farm equipment a reasonable time to
inspect and test equipment, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
Butler's opinion); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) (upholding state statute
limiting the size and weight of vehicles, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) (upholding state
regulation of oil taken from private wells, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter joining Butler's opinion); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932)
(upholding state regulation of liquor, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (upholding state statute limiting cigarette
advertising, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v.
Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932) (upholding ordinance requiring automobile renters to
pay license fees and purchase insurance, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van De-
vanter joining Butler's opinion); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co.,
284 U.S. 151 (1931) (upholding state law requiring insurance companies to submit to
arbitration, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282
U.S. 765 (1931) (upholding state law assessing state banks for maintenance of com-
mon fund to protect depositors, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Bain Pea-
nut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931) (upholding state law allowing suits to be
brought against corporations in any county in state, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Wampler v. LeCompte, 282 U.S. 172 (1930) (upholding state law for pres-
ervation of waterfowl and protection of hunters, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Corporation Comm'n v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431 (1930) (rejecting attempt by a
producer licensed to operate a cotton gin to enjoin state from licensing a competitor,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930) (upholding state law appropriating money for school books in private and
public schools, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Miller v. McLaughlin, 281
U.S. 261 (1930) (allowing state that banned fishing in river bordering another state to
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prohibit the possession of certain types of fishing equipment, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930) (upholding
state placement of fees on certain motor vehicles, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218 (1930) (upholding state law allow-
ing state to apply husband's property to the maintenance of his children without his
knowledge, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opin-
ion); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929) (upholding city ordi-
nance requiring gasoline tanks to be buried, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding state scheme for preserving coastal oys-
ter beds); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 14 (1928) (McReynolds
files lone dissent from Butler's opinion striking down state statute which sought to
force shrimp producers to pack shrimp within state); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537
(1928) (holding that a business entity operating in one state cannot perform local
business in another without that state's approval, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(upholding law requiring destruction of cedar trees infected with disease, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Grower's
Coop., 276 U.S. 71 (1928) (upholding state cooperative marketing act, with Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding power of cities to create zoning districts, with Butler,
McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) (upholding city zoning scheme, with Butler, McRey-
nolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135
(1927) (upholding state order limiting the weight of trucks in state, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (upholding
state forfeiture law applied to property used in the violation of state liquor laws, with
all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (recognizing the broad power of a state to regulate zoning, with Suther-
land writing opinion) (Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter dissent); Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (upholding state law
requiring private carriers for hire to become common carriers, with Butler and Van
Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Navig. Co. v. Wash-
ington, 270 U.S. 87, 103 (1926) (McReynolds and Sutherland dissent from opinion
striking down state quarantine law); Cole v. Norborne Land Drainage Dist., 270 U.S.
45 (1926) (upholding state law providing for a drainage district, with all Four Horse-
men joining opinion); Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148
(1925) (upholding state statute placing penalty on business that fails to get a permit
to do business in state, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
Butler's opinion); New York ex rel. Rosevale Realty Co. v. Kleinert, 268 U.S. 646
(1925) (affirming dismissal of a claim arguing that state zoning plan deprived devel-
oper of property in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925) (upholding power of state to
restrict fees lawyers can accept in workmen's compensation cases, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 325
(1925) (McReynolds dissents from opinion, in which Butler, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter join, striking down state law requiring common carriers to register with the
state in order to use state highways); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 325 (1925)
(McReynolds dissents from opinion, in which Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
join, striking down state law requiring common carriers to obtain permits before us-
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ing public highways); Merchants Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126
(1925) (upholding state regulation of insurance providers, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925) (upholding
state law which imposed criminal penalties on companies misrepresenting foods as
Kosher, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion);
Hixon v. Oakes, 265 U.S. 254 (1924) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting the filling
of prescriptions that contained more than eight ounces of alcohol, with Butler, Suth-
erland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Dillingham v. McLaughlin,
264 U.S. 370 (1924) (upholding expansive reading of state banking law, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924) (upholding state
law requiring every person engaged in business of carrying passengers to have insur-
ance, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion);
First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924) (upholding right of state
to regulate national bank, with McReynolds joining Sutherland's opinion) (Butler
and Van Devanter dissent); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923)
(upholding state regulation of water resources, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg,
260 U.S. 71 (1922) (upholding state law placing requirements on insurance compa-
nies, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S.
22 (1922) (upholding Pennsylvania statute concerning "party walls" which permitted
damage to private property without compensation, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921)
(upholding state law regulating the ownership of cotton gins, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Maguire v. Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921) (upholding
right of city to demolish building not meeting fire code requirements, with Van De-
vanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920)
(upholding city ordinance requiring license to own a dog, with Van Devanter joining
McReynolds' opinion); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920) (McReynolds
dissents from opinion, in which Van Devanter joins, holding that law requiring driv-
ers to be licensed within state could not apply to post office employees); American
Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 250 U.S. 2 (1919) (upholding state regula-
tion of insurance company's business within state, with McReynolds and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919)
(upholding power of state to publish non-binding "specifications" concerning scales,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Eddy,
249 U.S. 427 (1919) (upholding state product labeling regulation, with McReynolds
and Van Devanter joining opinion); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919)
(upholding city ordinance regulating the storage of gasoline, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1919)
(upholding state law requiring consumers to use state weighers, with McReynolds
and Van Devanter joining opinion); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919)
(upholding state statute banning the sale of skim milk, with McReynolds joining
opinion); Weigle v. Curtice Bros. Co., 248 U.S. 285 (1919) (upholding state law for-
bidding the sale of food products containing benzoic acid, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158 (1918)
(upholding state regulation of the transportation of illuminating oils and gasoline
through the state, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Interna-
tional & Great N. Ry. v. Anderson County, 246 U.S. 424 (1918) (upholding state law
requiring company to maintain its offices in a certain location, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242 (1918)
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(upholding power of city to divert water for water supply, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97 (1918) (upholding state law
allowing wife to sue barkeeper for loss of support due to the sale of alcohol to her
husband, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Crane v. Campbell,
245 U.S. 304 (1917) (upholding right of state to outlaw the personal possession of liq-
uor, with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Farmers Irrig. Dist. v. Ne-
braska, 244 U.S. 325 (1917) (upholding state court ruling forcing irrigation district to
build a bridge over canal for benefit of landowners, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (upholding state law forcing those obtaining a business li-
cense in state to submit to a power of attorney, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917)
(upholding municipal ordinance regulating the erection of billboards, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry.
Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding power of state to prevent liquor from being
shipped into state, with McReynolds concurring) (Van Devanter dissents); Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (affirming conviction of individual for violating state
statute requiring non-residents to pay registration fee to use state highways, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa,
242 U.S. 153 (1916) (upholding statute regulating sale of products advertised as ice
cream, with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Pacific Live Stock Co.
v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916) (upholding power of state to hold administrative hear-
ing to determine water rights, with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion);
Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916) (upholding conviction of com-
pany that failed to sell lard in specified sized containers according to state law, with
McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916)
(Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding statute requiring every able-
bodied man to work six ten-hour days per year on public roads in his county); Caro-
lina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U.S. 305 (1916) (upholding power of state to
allow state commission to determine private company's indebtedness to the state,
with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Interstate Amusement Co. v. Al-
bert, 239 U.S. 560 (1916) (upholding state law requiring companies to register in state
before being able to maintain action in state courts, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916)
(upholding city statute requiring reductions in smoke emissions, with McReynolds
and Van Devanter joining opinion); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915) (upholding
state statute requiring hotels to hire a night watchman, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting brick manufacturing within specified section of municipality,
with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446
(1915) (upholding state pure food law, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. St. Louis, 238 U.S. 41 (1915) (upholding state
court revocation of company charter because of failure to disclose involvement in
trusts, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (upholding decree enjoining the discharge of sulfur-
ous fumes that were destroying surrounding vegetation, with Van Devanter joining
McReynolds' opinion); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915)
(upholding power of state to regulate livery stables, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMas-
ter, 237 U.S. 63 (1915) (upholding regulations of state requiring foreign insurance
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corporations to invest in state securities, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (upholding state law prohibiting
shipment of citrus fruits that were unfit for consumption, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) (Van Devan-
ter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding state scheme of licensure and regulation of
motor vehicles); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914) (upholding state regulation
of liquor, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 531 (1914) (upholding state regulation of mining industry, with Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331 (1914)
(upholding state restriction of the manufacture of margarine, with Van Devanter
joining opinion); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913) (upholding state regulation of
coal mining industry, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Adams v. City of Milwau-
kee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913) (upholding municipal milk regulations placing heavier bur-
den on out-of-city producers than on city producers, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913) (upholding state regulation of
sewer systems and recognizing the ability to impose criminal penalties in order to
force compliance, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Rosenthal v. New York, 226
U.S. 260 (1912) (upholding state statute regulating the sale of junk wire, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912)
(upholding state's power to regulate liquors, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912) (upholding power of state to regulate oc-
cupations that could prove injurious or hazardous to the public, with Van Devanter
joining opinion); Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540 (1912) (upholding
state statute regulating the sale of livestock feed, with Van Devanter joining opin-
ion); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (upholding state regulation of the sale of
livestock feed, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S.
243 (1912) (upholding state law imposing liability on a stockholder for debts of a cor-
poration of that state and providing for enforcement of such liability, with Van De-
vanter writing opinion); Williams v. Walsh, 222 U.S. 415 (1912) (upholding state
regulation of black powder, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Red "C" Oil Mfg.
Co. v. Board of Agric., 222 U.S. 380 (1912) (upholding state regulation of oil, with
Van Devanter joining opinion); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911)
(upholding statute regulating assignment of future wages, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911) (upholding state
regulation requiring consent for the use of portraits, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (upholding a
state law limiting landowner's ability to pump resources from his own land, with Van
Devanter writing opinion).
5'See, e.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (denying injunction to
limit state law requiring certain number of employees on train, with McReynolds
joining in part and dissenting in part); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n,
283 U.S. 380 (1931) (recognizing power of the state to require interstate carrier to
construct passenger station, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931)
(declining to review state law which regulated the size of freight trains and switching
crews, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion);
New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930) (holding that
city regulation did not amount to a taking, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281
U.S. 537 (1930) (upholding state regulation preventing corporation from ceasing op-
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eration of railway, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Nashville, C. & S. Ry. v.
White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929) (refusing to strike down state regulation requiring posting
of flagmen, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v.
Mars, 278 U.S. 258 (1929) (upholding state law requiring railroad to pay the debts of
acquired railroad, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's
opinion); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 278 U.S. 24 (1928)
(upholding state commission's setting of safety specification for railroad crossing,
with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents);
Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Paving Dist. No. 16, 274 U.S. 387 (1927)
(upholding power of state to amend corporate charters, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 270 U.S. 550
(1926) (holding that gas pipeline which transported gas for intrastate consumption
was under regulation of state, with Butler, McReynolds, and Sutherland joining Van
Devanter's opinion); New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 269 U.S. 244 (1925) (upholding state regulation requiring gas company to
extend pipelines, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's
opinion); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 493 (1925)
(upholding power of state to require railroad to operate switching service, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267
U.S. 330 (1925) (upholding state order requiring street car company to continue op-
eration of line, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 265 U.S. 70 (1924) (upholding state's power to require railroad to
construct a crossing for vehicles across railroad tracks, with McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Durham Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Dur-
ham, 261 U.S. 149 (1923) (expansively reading a state's power to tax and regulate
corporations, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opin-
ion); Southern Ry. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316 (1922) (upholding state law requiring rail-
roads to pay or reject claims for property damage or treat them as liabilities owed,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Ref. Co., 259
U.S. 125 (1922) (upholding state corporation commission requirement that a foreign
corporation operate its local, private oil pipeline as a common carrier, with Van De-
vanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Police Court, 251
U.S. 22 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring street railway company to sprinkle the
street occupied by the railroad in order to control dust, with Van Devanter and
McReynolds joining opinion); Southern Pac. Ry. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 472 (1919)
(upholding fine against railroad because railroad refused to carry certain cargo on
line, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Lake Erie & W.R.R. v.
State Pub. Util. Comm'n, 249 U.S. 422 (1919) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter
opinion upholding state commission's order requiring railroad to restore a siding);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Ochs, 249 U.S. 416 (1919) (upholding state commission order
forcing railroad to build track to a plant, with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's
opinion); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434 (1918)
(upholding state requirement that railroad build sidewalk across line, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); City of Mitchell v. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co.,
246 U.S. 396 (1918) (upholding local ordinance forcing telephone company to re-
move its local service, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Gulf, C.
& S. Ry. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58 (1918) (upholding state order requiring train to stop at
certain city, with Van Devanter joining opinion); New York ex rel. New York &
Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345 (1917) (upholding state order requiring gas
company to extend gas lines, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
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Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298 (1917) (upholding Webb-
Kenyon Act allowing states to prevent common carriers from importing alcohol into
the state, with McReynolds writing opinion) (Van Devanter dissents); Sutton v. New
Jersey, 244 U.S. 258 (1917) (upholding state law requiring street cars to carry police
officers, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Rome Ry. & Light
Co. v. Floyd County, 243 U.S. 257 (1917) (upholding order of county forcing railroad
to pay for part of new bridge, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 603 (1917) (refusing to
suspend order of state commission forcing railroad to install service trains on route,
with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry. v.
Clough, 242 U.S. 375 (1917) (affirming state order forcing railroad to pay for drain-
age projects, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Chicago, T. &
S.E. Ry. v. Anderson, 242 U.S. 283 (1916) (upholding award to plaintiff against rail-
road because of railroad's failure to remove weeds from property as required, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Vandalia R.R. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255 (1916) (upholding state order requiring trains to have head-
lights of certain power, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. City of Raleigh, 242 U.S. 15 (1916) (affirming city ordinance
directing railroad to remove track from city sidewalk, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Detroit & Mackinac Ry. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 240 U.S.
564 (1916) (upholding state order requiring railroad to relay track, with Van Devan-
ter writing opinion) (McReynolds concurs in result); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 240 U.S. 324 (1916) (upholding state order requiring railroad to con-
nect track between two points, with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion);
Phoenix Ry. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277 (1915) (upholding state order requiring railroad
to double track its rail lines, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (upholding judgment against
railroad for failing to construct drainage ways as required, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 236 U.S.
615 (1915) (upholding power of state to require railroads to connect lines, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915) (upholding
power of state to impose penalties for violations of orders of public utilities commis-
sions, with Van Devanter joining opinion); South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. City of
Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915) (upholding power of state to regulate fumigation,
ventilation, and cleanliness of railroad cars in the absence of federal legislation, with
Van Devanter joining opinion); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 235 U.S. 121
(1914) (upholding power of state to require railroad to construct viaducts over tracks,
with Van Devanter joining opinion); Atlantic Coast L.R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280
(1914) (upholding state statute requiring railroads to use a certain type of headlight,
with Van Devanter joining opinion); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334
(1914) (upholding power of state to require railroad to carry pre-loaded rail cars,
with Van Devanter joining opinion); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325
(1914) (upholding power of state to impose double damages against railroad for fail-
ure to pay certain injury awards, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Atlantic Coast
L.R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (upholding power of city to enact
regulations of rail service, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430 (1914) (upholding state law requiring rail-
roads to abolish grade crossings and build viaducts at their own expense, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); Grand T. Ry. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 231 U.S. 457
(1913) (upholding commission order requiring railroads to use tracks for the inter-
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change of interstate traffic, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Yazoo & Miss. Val-
ley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912) (upholding state statute requir-
ing common carriers to settle claims for lost freight within sixty days, with Van De-
vanter writing opinion); Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160
(1912) (upholding state and municipal ordinances regulating use of streets by public
service corporation, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Crovo, 220 U.S. 364 (1911) (upholding state law imposing a penalty on telegraph
company for negligently failing to transmit a message promptly, with Van Devanter
joining opinion).
mSee, e.g., Bell Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 309 U.S. 30 (1940)
(per curiam) (dismissing appeal brought by telephone company to enjoin revision of
state telephone rates, with McReynolds joining opinion); American Toll Bridge Co.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 307 U.S. 486 (1939) (affirming state order lowering toll rates,
with McReynolds joining Butler's opinion); Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co.,
307 U.S. 104 (1939) (reversing lower court ruling restraining temporary rate order,
with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Petroleum Expl'r. Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938) (dismissing complaint brought by petroleum company
to prevent state from investigating gasoline rates, with Butler joining opinion)
(McReynolds concurs in result); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300
(1937) (holding that foreign corporation can be required to give information to state
tribunal where such did not impede commerce or was not overtaken by Congress,
with Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland joining opinion); Townsend v. Yeomans,
301 U.S. 441 (1937) (upholding state regulation of rates charged by tobacco ware-
housemen, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas
City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937) (upholding power of state to supersede
rates previously established by contract, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van De-
vanter joining Butler's opinion); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163
(1934) (rejecting contention by milk dealer that profit allowed by state was insuffi-
cient to cover operations, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining opin-
ion) (Sutherland concurs); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 292
U.S. 290 (1934) (ruling that gas company failed to meet its burden of showing com-
mission's ruling was arbitrary) (Butler and McReynolds concur) (Sutherland and Van
Devanter take no part); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934)
(ruling that rate set by state for telephone service was not confiscatory, with McRey-
nolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler concurs); Clark's Ferry
Bridge Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 U.S. 227 (1934) (sustaining state order limit-
ing rates to be charged by toll bridge company, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933)
(ruling that burden was on challenger to prove that a rate was confiscatory, with
McReynolds joining opinion) (Butler dissents with Sutherland joining dissenting
opinion) (Van Devanter takes no part); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Great N. Util. Co.,
289 U.S. 130 (1933) (upholding commission order prescribing specific rates, with
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 289 U.S. 67 (1933) (vacating a lower court's decree
granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the order of a state's public service
commission reducing telephone rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Wa-
bash Valley Elec. Co. v. Young, 287 U.S. 488 (1933) (rejecting claim of utility that
rate set by state was confiscatory, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter join-
ing Sutherland's opinion); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) (upholding
state statute regulating private contract carriers and their use of highways, with
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McReynolds and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion) (Butler dissents);
Western Dist. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 285 U.S. 119 (1932) (granting states
greater leeway in forcing utilities to show that out of state supplier rates were reason-
able, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Board of R.R. Comm'rs v.'Great N.
Ry. 281 U.S. 412 (1930) (holding that federal courts will not interfere with railroad
rates established by a state for its internal commerce on the ground that they dis-
criminate against interstate commerce until such discrimination has been found by
the ICC, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 281 U.S. 331 (1930) (rejecting insurance company suit seeking to enjoin
state rate order, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's
opinion); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Trans. Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929) (holding
that railway suit to enjoin state from imposing rate could not yet be entertained, with
McReynolds writing opinion) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler dissent); Sutter
Butte Canal Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 279 U.S. 125 (1929) (upholding power of state
to modify rates charged by a public utility for water, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300 (1929) (limiting
ability of companies to challenge confiscatory rates, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds concurs); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S.
440 (1928) (upholding state insurance rate cut, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S.
207 (1927) (upholding right of state to regulate tugboat rates, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Arkansas R.R. Comm'n v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 597 (1927) (granting state greater power to set
intrastate rail rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Board of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926) (upholding state imposition of
rates on telephone company, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter join-
ing Butler's opinion); Live Oak Water Users' Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 269 U.S.
354 (1926) (limiting power of court to review decision of state court upholding rate
fixing order, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opin-
ion); Ortega Co. v. Triay, 260 U.S. 103 (1922) (holding that state was not barred from
ordering railroad to increase its rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Witchita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922) (holding that
state may delegate legislative power to administrative boards to deal with rate sched-
ules, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of
Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922) (holding that profits based on rate set by municipality
were adequate, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. 234 (1922) (holding that company was not
deprived of due process by state reducing rates because of poor service, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
Springfield, 257 U.S. 66 (1921) (upholding state law permitting city to own electric
plant and set its own rate, against claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of competing power plant regulated by the state, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 256 U.S. 134
(1921) (mem.) (holding that overcharges placed on railroad will stand where statute
under which they were imposed was constitutional, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23
(1920) (holding that state may regulate interstate gas rates where Congress has not
acted, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Producers Transp. Co.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 228 (1920) (upholding state law holding that anyone
who owns pipeline for public benefit was under state regulation as a common carrier,
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with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); St. Louis, I. Mtn. & S. Ry. v. Wil-
liams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) (upholding penalty enacted by state against railroad for
violating state rate provision, with Van Devanter writing opinion) (McReynolds dis-
sents); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256 (1919) (upholding
dismissal of suit against city to enjoin enforcement of rate lowering ordinance, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co.
v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399 (1919) (holding that railroad could not be let out of
contract with city because of unforeseen costs due to war, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919)
(upholding price regulation imposed by public utilities board on gas company, with
Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub.
Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372 (1919) (upholding state price fixing of electricity rates, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918) (affirming state com-
mission ruling ordering rail companies to discontinue certain charges, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. State Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 245 U.S. 493 (1918) (affirming dismissal of bills against state commission
that ordered lowering of rates for railroad routes, with McReynolds joining Van De-
vanter's opinion); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917) (dismissing suit
seeking to enjoin order of state commission requiring certain rates for rail tickets,
with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Puget Sound Traction,
Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574 (1917) (denying injunction against state
utilities commission order requiring through service at a certain rate, with Van De-
vanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564
(1917) (dismissing bill to seek injunction against state order setting rates, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. McGrew Coal
Co., 244 U.S. 191 (1917) (upholding state law preventing railroad from charging more
for short hauls than longer hauls, with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion);
Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917) (upholding power of state to regulate individ-
ual who owned water system used by community, with Van Devanter joining opin-
ion) (McReynolds dissents); Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Newark, 242
U.S. 405 (1917) (upholding municipal rate structure ordinance, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. State Pub. Util. Comm'n,
242 U.S. 333 (1917) (upholding state utilities commission order setting railroad rates,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Missouri v. Chi., B. & Q.R.R.,
241 U.S. 533 (1916) (striking railroad defense of confiscation in action by state to re-
cover back rates, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Terminal
Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, Newman & Brownlow, 241 U.S. 252 (1916) (holding that com-
pany was within jurisdiction of District of Columbia regulatory board, and upholding
two of three types of rate regulation, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 238 U.S. 174 (1915)
(dismissing complaint seeking to prevent enforcement of railroad commission order
setting street railway rates, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153 (1915) (affirming dismissal
of suit seeking injunction against city order fixing gas rates, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); New Orleans Tax Payers' Protective Ass'n v. Sewer-
age & Water Bd., 237 U.S. 33 (1915) (upholding state law and city ordinance estab-
lishing rates for drinking water, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opin-
ion); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Finn, 235 U.S. 601 (1915) (upholding state order
setting railroad rates, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Port Richmond & Bergen
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Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317 (1914) (upholding or-
dinance fixing rates on ferry service, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Louisville
& Nash. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913) (upholding state delegation to railroad
commission of railroad rate oversight, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Wood v.
Vandalia R.R., 231 U.S. 1 (1913) (ruling that rate fixed by state will not be ruled con-
fiscatory in absence of proof of value of intrastate property and interstate business,
with Van Devanter joining opinion); Allen v. St. Louis, I. Mtn. & S. Ry., 230 U.S. 553
(1913) (upholding right of state to set intrastate rail rates, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537 (1913) (holding that allega-
tions in bill were insufficient to show that rate set by state was confiscatory, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); Portland Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
229 U.S. 397 (1913) (upholding right of state to set street railway fare rates, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); Murray v. City of Pocatello, 226 U.S. 318 (1912)
(upholding state statute establishing fixed water rates, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 225 U.S. 430 (1912)
(holding that Court requires clear evidence before it will rule rate confiscatory, with
Van Devanter joining opinion).
59 See, e.g., Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163 (1933) (holding that a state had
not violated the Contracts Clause by requiring interest to be added to recoveries in
actions for unliquidated damages caused by a breach of contract, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) (ruling that state
interference with agreement made with toll bridge owners did not violate the Con-
tracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Shriver v. Woodbine Say.
Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932) (rejecting stockholder's argument that a state law violated
the Contracts Clause by placing upon him an obligation to pay assessments that did
not exist when he purchased the stock, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Kirk
v. Maumee Valley Elec. Co., 279 U.S. 797 (1929) (holding that state had not violated
Contracts Clause by requiring company to relinquish part of a canal the state
authorized for its use, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Larson v. South Da-
kota, 278 U.S. 429 (1929) (holding that state's building of a free bridge after granting
exclusive license to ferry franchise company did not violate Contracts Clause, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Millsaps College v. City of Jackson, 275 U.S. 129
(1927) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding
property tax against Contracts Clause challenge); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Georgia,
269 U.S. 67 (1925) (holding state law allowing state more easily to assert its title to
property did not violate Contracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924) (stating that Contracts Clause applies to leg-
islative and not judicial action, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Tidal Oil
Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924) (declaring as well settled the rule that a state
court's decision to overturn an earlier case which interferes with losing party's prop-
erty rights does not violate the Contracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923) (upholding as not
violative of the Contracts Clause a state law requiring unclaimed savings banks de-
posits to escheat to state, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); New York ex rel.
Clyde v. Gilchrist, 262 U.S. 94 (1923) (stating that the Court will be wary of over-
turning state court decisions concerning matters of local policy, like systems of taxa-
tion, as violating the Contracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Ar-
kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 379 (1923) (ruling that
state has the power to modify certain contracts when it was in the public's interest,
with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Colum-
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bia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923) (ruling that Contracts
Clause affords no protection from impairment of obligation through judicial decision,
with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114 (1923) (ruling that Contracts Clause affords no
protection from impairment of obligation through judicial decision, with Butler,
McReynolds, and Sutherland joining Van Devanter's opinion); Conley v. Barton, 260
U.S. 677 (1923) (upholding legislature's power to modify or change existing remedies
or procedure without impairing rights of contract, as long as substantial remedy re-
mains, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Galveston Wharf Co. v. City of
Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1923) (limiting the cases protected by the Contracts Clause,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 255
U.S. 171 (1921) (holding a city's requirement that railway company remove track
once its charter expires did not violate the Contracts Clause, with McReynolds and
Van Devanter joining opinion); Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361 (1920) (holding that
a state law withdrawing employer's alternative of self-insuring against liability for
workmen's compensation did not violate the Contracts Clause, with Van Devanter
joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254
U.S. 126 (1920) (upholding New York amendment to charter that required the com-
pany to provide a roadway and path for pedestrians on its railroad bridge between
New York and Canada, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents);
Troy U.R.R. v. Mealy, 254 U.S. 47 (1920) (deferring to state court finding that ex-
emption from taxes was privilege, not contract right protected by Constitution, with
Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co.,
252 U.S. 499 (1920) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds upholding statute regulating
capacity of foreign corporations to acquire property in the state against Contracts
Clause challenge); Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. City of Milwaukee, 252 U.S. 100 (1920)
(upholding regulation of street railway company against Contracts Clause challenge,
with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Hardin-Wyandot Light-
ing Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 251 U.S. 173 (1919) (upholding power of municipality to
limit and regulate street lights against Contracts Clause challenge, with Van Devanter
and McReynolds joining opinion); Bank of Oxford v. Love, 250 U.S. 603 (1919) (Van
Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding state regulation of banks against
Contracts Clause challenge); City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S.
394 (1919) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion upholding state regulation of
gas rates against Contracts Clause challenge); Missouri & Ark. Lumber & Mining Co.
v. Sebastain County, 249 U.S. 170 (1919) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion
upholding state's power to cancel interest on certain judgments); McCoy v. Union
Elev. R.R., 247 U.S. 354 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion holding
that the Contracts Clause does not relate to judicial action impairing the obligation of
contracts); Contributors to Pennsylvania Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20
(1917) (holding that state eminent domain power was not divested by contract with
hospital and the contract did not fall within the protection of the Contracts Clause,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Morris Canal & Banking Co.
v. Baird, 239 U.S. 126 (1915) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding
state taxation of canal company against Contracts Clause challenge); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Portland, 227 U.S. 559 (1913) (holding that city preventing the use of locomo-
tives and freight hauling on tracks laid under city franchise did not violate the Con-
tracts Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Miller, 221
U.S. 408 (1911) (Van Devanter writes opinion holding that wrongful death statute
repealing the immunity from such suits conferred by the company's charter did not
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violate the Contracts Clause); Shawnee Sewerage & Drainage Co. v. Stearns, 220
U.S. 462 (1911) (holding that a breach of contract by a municipality did not violate
the Contracts Clause, with Van Devanter joining opinion). See also Veix v. Sixth
Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (McReynolds concurs in result of
opinion upholding statute curtailing rights of certificate holders to make withdrawals
from savings and loans); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939) (upholding limita-
tion to mortgagee's deficiency judgment after a foreclosure, with McReynolds and
Butler joining opinion); Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (1937)
(holding that a change in state law concerning the remedies available against bank
stockholders did not violate the Contracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300
U.S. 124 (1937) (upholding state law giving protection to debtors, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935) (holding that a state
law providing for the reorganization rather than liquidation of insolvent banks did
not violate the Contracts Clause, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United
States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934) (rejecting challenge to statute
curtailing mortgagee's rights to summary remedies during periods of declared emer-
gency, with Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler joining McReynolds' opinion);
-District of Columbia v. Andrew Paper Co., 256 U.S. 582 (1921) (holding that grants
of vaults under D.C. sidewalks were revocable licenses and D.C. could assess rent
against them, with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); Long Sault Dev.
Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272 (1916) (affirming court decision upholding N.Y. law which
revoked a contract given to create dams, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
61279 U.S. 337 (1929).
61 Id. at 339-340.
6 See, e.g., Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939) (Butler joins McReynolds' opin-
ion upholding animal disposal licensing statute against dormant Commerce Clause
challenge); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion dismissing, on jurisdictional grounds, suit seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of a statute regulating and requiring a license for the business
of purchasing contracts arising out of retail installment sales); Stanley v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 295 U.S. 76 (1935) (per curiam) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding
state scheme for licensing and regulating intrastate carriers for hire on state high-
ways); Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930) (McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Butler join Van Devanter's opinion upholding as res judicata a state public utili-
ties commission's licensing scheme for passenger buses against dormant Commerce
Clause and privileges and immunities challenges); Herbring v. Lee, 280 U.S. 111
(1929) (all Four Horsemen join opinion declining to reach constitutional challenge to
state law requiring foreign fire insurance companies to do local business through li-
censed local agents and regulating the number of agents that may be appointed in a
given city); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927) (all Four Horsemen
join opinion upholding a state statute requiring foreign insurance companies to ob-
tain licenses to solicit and do business within the state); Hayman v. City of Galveston,
273 U.S. 414 (1927) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding state hospital's exclu-
sion of osteopaths); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry., 273 U.S. 45 (1927)
(Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion upholding state
law requiring a license and a certificate of public convenience and necessity for intra-
state carriage of passengers for hire on public highways); Graves v. Minnesota, 272
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U.S. 425 (1926) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding state scheme of licensing
dentists); Lehmann v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 263 U.S. 394 (1923) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion upholding statute giving private board power to grant certifi-
cates of registration to persons deemed qualified to practice as Certified Public Ac-
countants, and to decertify any accountant it deems unfit); Douglas v. Noble, 261
U.S. 165 (1923) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding statute delegating to a
board of practicing dentists power to grant licenses, set professional standards and
rules of conduct, and to bar those dentists deemed unfit); LaTourette v. McMaster,
248 U.S. 465 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding statute
requiring those licensed as insurance brokers to be state residents and to have been
licensed insurance agents of the state for at least two years); Payne v. Kansas ex rel.
Brewster, 248 U.S. 112 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion upholding
statute forbidding sale of farm produce on commission without a license); Watters v.
Michigan, 248 U.S. 65 (1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding
conviction under ordinance requiring a license to peddle goods according to state
law); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (Van Devanter joins opinion up-
holding statute regulating securities dealers and requiring them to be licensed)
(McReynolds dissents); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917)
(Van Devanter joins opinion upholding statute regulating securities dealers and re-
quiring them to be licensed) (McReynolds dissents); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539 (1917) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding statute regulating securities
dealers and requiring them to be licensed) (McReynolds dissents); Crane v. Johnson,
242 U.S. 339 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding state
scheme for licensing "drugless" healers); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344
(1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding state scheme for li-
censing optometrists and ophthalmologists); Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding ordinance for licens-
ing and regulating private detectives); Toyota v. Territory of Hawaii, 226 U.S. 184
(1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding statute regulating licensing of auc-
tioneers). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupa-
tional Licensing, 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 487 (1965)
(surveying occupational licensing jurisprudence in period just prior to the tenures of
the Four Horsemen).
"Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
61 Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319 (1925) (McReynolds, J.).
6Compare Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Butler join Sutherland's opinion striking down New Jersey statute regulating fees
charged by employment agencies) and Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (Van
Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion invalidating Washington law banning employ-
ment agencies) with Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916) (Van Devanter joins
McReynolds' opinion upholding Michigan statute regulating employment agencies).
67 Compare Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion striking down Nebraska statute)
with Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Sutherland join Butler's opinion upholding revised Nebraska statute) and
Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion up-
holding Chicago ordinance).
6See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (Butler joins McReynolds'
opinion upholding National Firearms Act); United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148
(1939) (applying Motor Carriers Act in preventing bus driver from transporting per-
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sons, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (placing telephone company within regulation of FCC)
(McReynolds concurring in the result and joining Butler's concurring opinion); Hines
v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85 (1938) (recognizing federal law limiting attorney's fees in vet-
erans benefits suits, with Butler and McReynolds joining opinion); Swayne & Hoyt
Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937) (recognizing ability of Secretary of Com-
merce to set tariff rates, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining opin-
ion) (Sutherland dissents); Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115 (1937)
(recognizing broad power in Congress to seize enemy property, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.,
299 U.S. 445 (1937) (upholding provisions of Bankruptcy Act, with all Four Horse-
men joining opinion); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S.
334 (1937) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding Ashurst-Sumners Act forbid-
ding shipment of convict-made goods into states prohibiting their use, sale or posses-
-sion); American Tel. & Tel. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936) (upholding FCC
regulations, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (upholding rate-fixing order of the Secretary of Ag-
riculture, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1 (1935) (upholding executive order creating a bird reservation, with all Four Horse-
men joining opinion); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co. 289
U.S. 266 (1933) (upholding the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to
regulate radio communications and the authority of Congress to delegate to the FRC
the discretion to allocate the various broadcast channels as it deems necessary for the
public interest, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. of Chi. v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935) (holding that in-
junctions issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act and preventing sales of collateral
did not violate due process, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining
Sutherland's opinion); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933) (giving executive agency broad discretion in setting tariff rates, with Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Reichelder-
fer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932) (holding that Congress has power to modify housing
contracts in D.C., with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Highland v. Russell Car
& Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929) (expansively reading congressional war pow-
ers, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding presidential delega-
tion to Tariff Commission of investigative powers, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Atwater & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 188 (1927) (ruling that govern-
ment does not have to compensate for delays in crediting money owed under federal
law, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion);
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (ruling that Congress can prevent acts on
private lands that endanger public lands, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927) (broadly reading congressional power
under the Federal Reserve Act, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Great N.
Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U.S. 182 (1927) (upholding forced transfer of enemy owned
stocks, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Sutherland
dissents); United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926) (reiterating Con-
gress's broad power to seize enemy property, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining Butler's opinion) (Sutherland takes no part); Thornton v. United States, 271
U.S. 414 (1926) (broadly reading the power of the Department of Agriculture, with
all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215
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(1926) (expansively reading the power of the government to seize enemy property,
with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Goldsmith
v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (upholding board's power to set rules
for admission of lawyers and accountants before it, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); White v. Mechanics Sec. Corp., 269 U.S. 283 (1925) (recognizing govern-
ment's power to seize enemy property, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Margolin v. United States, 269 U.S. 93 (1925) (upholding act limiting attorney's fees,
with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Old Do-
minion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925) (interpreting act to grant U.S.
greater use of condemnation power, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Selz-
man v. United States, 268 U.S. 466 (1925) (broadly construing Congress's power to
legislate under the Eighteenth Amendment, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (all Four Horsemen join opinion
upholding National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919); United States v. Butterworth-
Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387 (1925) (allowing government broad discretion over use of
monetary advances granted to contractors to buy war supplies, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Swiss Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Miller, 267 U.S. 42 (1925) (broadly construing the Trading with the Enemy Act, with
Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Erie
Coal & Coke Corp. v. United States, 266 U.S. 518 (1925) (holding that government
has broad power to refuse certain contracts in the auctioning of public property, with
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Campbell v.
United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924) (holding that the government need not compen-
sate owners of property for diminution in value caused by public use takings, with
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); James Ever-
ard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924) (expansively reading Congress' power to
regulate under the Eighteenth Amendment, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924) (upholding congressional
regulation of national banks, with Butler and Van Devanter joining opinion)
(McReynolds joins Sutherland's dissenting opinion); McConaughey v. Morrow, 263
U.S. 39 (1923) (expansively reading presidential power over Canal Zone, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); United States v. Sischo, 262 U.S. 165 (1923)
(upholding act requiring forfeiture of property contained on ship but not listed on
ship's manifest, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100 (1923) (broadly construing Congress' power under the Eighteenth
Amendment, with Butler joining Van Devanter's opinion) (McReynolds and Suth-
erland dissent); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) (upholding prop-
erty seizure under the Trading with the Enemy Act, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581 (1923) (allowing
federal government to condemn certain land for the public good, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Mason v. United States, 260
U.S. 545 (1923) (ruling that executive branch has power to declare certain lands off
limits from settlement and appropriation, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devan-
ter joining Sutherland's opinion); Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 188
(1922) (holding price fixing during war not a taking of property by government, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons,
259 U.S. 80 (1922) (ruling that Eighteenth Amendment supersedes foreign treaties,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138
(1922) (holding that whether a product's labeling was misleading was solely within
review of Postmaster General, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
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Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) (holding that
Congress has power to regulate a non-navigable river, with Van Devanter joining
opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921)
(upholding seizure of property under Trading with the Enemy Act, with McReynolds
joining Van Devanter's opinion); Goldsmith Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921) (upholding government power to confiscate goods which were hidden to avoid
taxation, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); National Pro-
hibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (Van Devanter writes opinion upholding validity
of the Eighteenth Amendment) (McReynolds concurs); United States v. Simpson,
252 U.S. 465 (1920) (upholding conviction for transporting liquor in violation of Reed
Amendment, with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920) (upholding authority of President to set aside land for
forest reserves, with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding treaty giving federal government the power to
regulate the hunting of migratory birds, with McReynolds joining opinion) (Van De-
vanter dissents); Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 252 U.S. 147 (1920) (upholding
federal fines against railway for delay in delivering mail, with McReynolds and Van
Devanter joining opinion); Grand T.W. Ry. v. United States, 252 U.S. 112 (1920)
(forcing railroad to transport mail because railroad's land was granted by the federal
government on the condition of carrying the mails, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); Public Util. Comm'rs v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U.S. 401 (1920)
(upholding power of Congress to force carrier to ship mail for free, with McReynolds
and Van Devanter joining opinion); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135
(1919) (holding that federal war powers supersede rights of state governments to set
intrastate rail rates, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Houston v.
St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919) (upholding product label regulation
by Secretary of Agriculture, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919) (upholding Webb-Kenyon Act, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918)
(upholding power of Congress to limit the alienation of land granted under the
Homestead Act, with Van Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Pittsburgh Melt-
ing Co. v. Totten, 248 U.S. 1 (1918) (upholding regulation of food products by De-
partment of Agriculture, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); First
Nat'l Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917) (upholding part of
Federal Reserve Bank Act, with McReynolds joining opinion) (Van Devanter dis-
sents); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. United States, 244 U.S. 351 (1917) (upholding
award for government for trees cut while building railroad through national forest,
with Van Devanter writing opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Chesbrough v.
Woodworth, 244 U.S. 72 (1917) (upholding award for investor under National Bank
Act, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Oregon & Cal. R.R. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 549 (1917) (enjoining railroads from selling lands granted to
them from federal government, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds
takes no part); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917)
(holding federal title to land superior to state, with McReynolds joining Van Devan-
ter's opinion); Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) (forcing
bridge company to rebuild bridge according to specifications of Secretary of War,
with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Lane v. United States ex rel.
Mickadiet, 241 U.S. 201 (1916) (holding Secretary of Interior has sole power to de-
termine heirs of Indian man, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes
no part); Town of Essex v. New England Tel. Co., 239 U.S. 313 (1916) (upholding
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power of Congress to allow telegraph lines to be built over postal routes, with Van
Devanter joining McReynolds' opinion); Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. United States,
231 U.S. 363 (1913) (upholding application of commodities clause of Hepburn Act
against Fifth Amendment challenge, with Van Devanter joining opinion); McDer-
mott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (noting that Congress has power to bar from
commerce harmful or illicit articles, with Van Devanter joining opinion); United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (approving congressional delegation of regu-
latory power to the Secretary of Agriculture by upholding regulation requiring per-
mit to graze any livestock or forest reserve, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) (same); Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 94 (1911) (extending act to prevent the cruelty of animals to
all interstate shipments of cattle, with Van Devanter joining opinion).
1 See United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion reading broadly the Act's prohibi-
tion against misbranding so as to prevent the use of misleading as well as false labels);
United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds'
opinion reversing judgment sustaining demurrer to indictment for violating Act's
misbranding prohibition); Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918) (McReynolds
joins Van Devanter's opinion affirming conviction for violation of Act's misbranding
prohibition); United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265 (1916) (Van Devanter
joins opinion overturning directed verdict for company charged with misbranding)
(McReynolds takes no part); Seven Cases of Eckman's Alternative v. United States,
239 U.S. 510 (1916) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding Sherley Amendment to
Act, defining misbranding to include false and fraudulent claims of curative effects)
(McReynolds takes no part); United States v. Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654
(1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding regulations promulgated to enforce
the Act); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (Van Devanter joins
opinion upholding application of the Act to articles within the borders of a state); see
also United States v. Lewis, 235 U.S. 282 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion revers-
ing judgment quashing indictment under Meat Inspection Law of 1906) (McReynolds
takes no part).
I Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (Van Devanter writes
opinion upholding the Act).
71 See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion holding that state-owned railroads were subject to the Act); New York Cent.
R.R. v. United States, 265 U.S. 41 (1924) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Suther-
land join Butler's opinion reading expansively the duty imposed by the Act on the
railroads to have their cars equipped with power brakes for the safety of their em-
ployees); United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 254 U.S. 251 (1920) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion rejecting claim that Act does not apply to "transfer trains"
operating within rail yard and not on main track); Spokane & I. Emp. R.R. v. United
States, 241 U.S. 344 (1916) (Van Devanter joins opinion holding that street railway
cars employed in interstate traffic were subject to the Act) (McReynolds takes no
part); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (Van Devanter writes opin-
ion upholding the Act).
n See United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936) (all Four Horsemen join opin-
ion reversing order enjoining Secretary of Agriculture from instituting prosecutions
for violations of an order fixing rates under the Act); Acker v. United States, 298
U.S. 426 (1936) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding rates established by the
Secretary of Agriculture under the Act); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States,
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280 U.S. 420 (1930) (all Four Horsemen join opinion sustaining Act against due proc-
ess challenge); United States v. American Livestock Comm'n Co., 279 U.S. 435
(1929) (all Four Horsemen join opinion recognizing power of Secretary of Agricul-
ture under the Act to order discontinuance of boycott of market agency by others on
livestock exchange); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (Van Devanter joins
opinion sustaining Act against Commerce Clause challenge) (McReynolds dissents).
7- See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (Van Devanter and Butler
join opinion upholding Grain Futures Act) (McReynolds and Sutherland dissent).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) (McReynolds joins
opinion reversing lower court decision that state statute of limitations bars FHA's
claim against decedent's estate); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21
(1939) (McReynolds joins opinion affirming order requiring local court clerk to rec-
ord mortgage held by Home Owners' Loan Corp. without payment of the usual re-
cording fees) (Butler takes no part); United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214 (1939)
(McReynolds and Butler join opinion reversing lower court decision sustaining de-
murrers to an indictment under the Connally Hot Oil Act); Utah Fuel Co. v. National
Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (Butler joins McReynolds opinion sus-
taining authority of commission to disclose business data furnished by coal producers
pursuant to commission's order); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419
(1938) (Butler joins opinion upholding provision of Public Utility Act of 1935 re-
quiring public utility holding companies to register with the SEC) (McReynolds dis-
sents); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (upholding revised Frazier-
Lemke Act, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Ashwander v. Tennessee Val-
ley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join opinion
upholding power of Congress to authorize construction of a vast hydroelectric dam
project and the sale of the electricity produced there in competition with private
power companies) (McReynolds dissents). See also note 52, supra, and cases cited
therein.
7
1 See, e.g., United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940)
(reversing lower court decree enjoining ICC order, with McReynolds joining opin-
ion); United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939) (reversing lower court decree en-
joining ICC order, with McReynolds joining opinion); Union Stock Yard & Transit
Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 213 (1939) (affirming dismissal of petition seeking to
set aside ICC order nullifying rate update made by rail company, with McReynolds
joining opinion); Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141 (1939) (affirming
dismissal of petition seeking to enjoin ICC order, with McReynolds joining opinion)
(Butler takes no part); Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939)
(upholding power of ICC to reverse and amend its own orders, with McReynolds
joining Butler's opinion); Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S.
516 (1939) (affirming tariff set by ICC on producers of grain, with Butler and
McReynolds joining opinion); United States v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 304 U.S.
156 (1938) (reversing decree for company seeking to enjoin ICC order, with Butler
and McReynolds joining opinion); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 304 U.S. 58
(1938) (upholding dismissal of case seeking to enjoin enforcement of ICC order, with
Butler joining McReynolds' opinion); United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate
Co., 301 U.S. 402 (1937) (reversing lower court ruling setting aside ICC order re-
quiring carriers to desist from spotting cars on industrial plant tracks, with McRey-
nolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler dissents); United
States v. Idaho, 298 U.S. 105 (1936) (upholding ICC order allowing abandonment of
a railroad spur track, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
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Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447 (1936) (upholding ICC decree ordering intrastate rate
increase to end discrimination against interstate commerce, with McReynolds, Suth-
erland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Atlanta, B. & C.R.R. v. United
States, 296 U.S. 33 (1935) (refusing to question factual determination of ICC con-
cerning accounting and valuation practices, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 476 (1935) (upholding rate
structure set by ICC, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United States v. Bal-
timore & O.R.R., 293 U.S. 454 (1935) (upholding power of ICC to require railroads
to change safety equipment, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Ohio v. United
States, 292 U.S. 498 (1934) (upholding ICC order raising intrastate coal rates to end
interstate discrimination, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Illinois Com-
merce Comm'n v. United States, 292 U.S. 474 (1934) (upholding factual determina-
tion of ICC in rate raising order, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934) (stating that ICC order
will be upheld so long as some rational basis exists for its determination and uphold-
ing decision of ICC to lower rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Florida
v. United States, 292 U.S. 1 (1934) (upholding power of ICC to increase intrastate
rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
291 U.S. 457 (1934) (holding that challenger to ICC order must exhaust remedies of
ICC before appealing to courts, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining
Sutherland's opinion); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933) (upholding
ICC's power to prescribe minimum intrastate rates, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490 (1933) (limiting rehearing
to challenge order of ICC, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134 (1932) (allowing ICC broad discretion in requiring
certain accounting practices, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter join-
ing opinion) (Butler takes no part); Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397 (1932) (upholding
factual findings of ICC as conclusive, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion) (Butler dissents on standing grounds); Claiborne-Annapolis
Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932) (upholding ICC permit allowing ex-
tension of railroad line, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining McRey-
nolds' opinion); Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 (1932) (upholding
ICC order forcing railroad to abandon an unprofitable line, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Atlantic Coast L.R.R. v. United States, 284 U.S. 288 (1932)
(upholding power of ICC to place conditions on leases by railroads, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 284
U.S. 125 (1931) (upholding ICC order raising interstate rates, with McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining Butler's opinion); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. United States, 283 U.S. 765 (1931) (recognizing the power of ICC to set intrastate
rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern
Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 654 (1931) (upholding power of ICC to attack international
through rates it deems excessive, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
joining Butler's opinion); Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 501
(1931) (upholding ICC's factual conclusions of discrimination in warehouse leasing,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.
235 (1931) (limiting court's jurisdiction to overturn certain negative orders of ICC,
with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Louis-
ville & Nash. R.R. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740 (1931) (upholding order of ICC
prohibiting transport of certain rail cars at reduced rates, with Butler and Van De-
vanter joining opinion) (McReynolds and Sutherland dissent); Pittsburgh & W. Va.
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Ry. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479 (1930) (limiting power of one railroad to sue to
change a rate set by the ICC for a competitor, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930) (limiting standing
rights of certain shippers disadvantaged by ICC order, with all Four Horsemen join-
ing opinion); United States v. Erie R.R., 280 U.S. 98 (1929) (upholding power of ICC
to set intrastate rates involving foreign commerce, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 768 (1929) (liberally con-
struing the power of the ICC to determine the reasonableness of rates, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929)
(upholding power of ICC to set intrastate rates, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van
Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); Great N. Ry. v. United States, 277 U.S. 172
(1928) (limiting the power of companies to have an ICC order reviewed, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Cleveland, C., Chi. & S. Ry. v. United States, 275 U.S.
404 (1928) (extending the power of ICC to require railroads to build switch connec-
tions, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); News Synd. Co. v. New York Cent.
R.R., 275 U.S. 179 (1927) (upholding power of ICC to determine reasonableness of
international through rates, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining
Butler's opinion); The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927) (upholding ICC
regulation limiting the number of cars among coal mines, with Butler, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds dissents); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 274 U.S. 29 (1927) (deferring to ICC's factual determination, with
Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opinion); United States
v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927) (upholding statutory provision mak-
ing all property valuations by ICC prima facie evidence in court actions, with
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Butler takes no part);
Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926) (allowing ICC wide latitude in
determining unjustness of rates, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); United
States v. New York Cent. R.R., 272 U.S. 457 (1926) (expansively reading power of
ICC to force a carrier to provide transportation services, with Butler, McReynolds,
and Van Devanter joining opinion) (Sutherland takes no part); Western Paper Mak-
ers' Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268 (1926) (limiting procedural require-
ments in ICC hearings, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Turner, Dennis &
Lowry Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. Ry., 271 U.S. 259 (1926) (upholding power of
ICC to place charges on certain cargoes, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion);
Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153_(1926) (expansively reading power of ICC to
authorize abandonment of railroad branch lines, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 127 (1926) (limiting the ability of
shareholder to prevent company from complying with ICC order, with Butler,
McReynolds, and Sutherland joining Van Devanter's opinion); United States v. P.
Koenig Coal Co., 270 U.S. 512 (1926) (construing a criminal statute against contract-
ing around ICC rate schedules in favor of ICC, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. United States, 270 U.S. 287 (1926) (upholding power
of the ICC to structure contractual agreements between carriers, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron
Co., 269 U.S. 217 (1925) (upholding an ICC order requiring carrier to make a repara-
tion of the excess charged over established freight rate, with Butler, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds writes separately arguing defendant
suffered no damage); United States v. Village of Hubbard, 266 U.S. 474 (1925)
(upholding power of ICC to increase intrastate interurban railway rates, with Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds writes separately);
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United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 266 U.S. 191 (1924) (broadly construing ICC's
power to end discrimination in carrier service, with all Four Horsemen joining opin-
ion); United States v. New River Co., 265 U.S. 533 (1924) (ruling ICC has power to
regulate the distribution of coal cars, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devan-
ter joining Butler's opinion); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456
(1924) (allowing ICC great leeway in setting rates, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Tennessee, 262 U.S. 318 (1923) (allowing ICC
to set aside state regulations of intrastate rates if they unduly affect interstate com-
merce, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); New England Divisions Case, 261
U.S. 184 (1923) (expansively reading the ICC's power to set rates, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)
(affirming ICC's power to set binding rates on shippers, with all Four Horsemen
joining opinion); Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158 (1922) (dismissing bill by state to enjoin
ICC order, with McReynolds joining Van Devanter's opinion); New York v. United
States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922) (affirming dismissal of a bill by state to enjoin enforce-
ment of ICC order, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Louisiana
& P.B. Ry. v. United States, 257 U.S. 114 (1921) (upholding rate on tap lines set by
ICC, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Weber, 257 U.S. 85 (1921) (upholding ICC reparation award to shipper, with
McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 57 (1920) (upholding ICC order preventing railroads from absorbing
switching charges, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Spiller v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117 (1920) (reversing lower court ruling invalidating
ICC reparation order, with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918) (upholding repara-
tion award granted by ICC, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. United States, 245 U.S. 463 (1918) (affirming order of ICC
restricting rate levels on certain rail routes, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. United States, 245 U.S. 136 (1917) (dismissing
bill seeking enjoinment of ICC rate setting order, with McReynolds and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917) (requiring company leaders to
disclose political expenditures to the ICC, with McReynolds and Van Devanter join-
ing opinion); American Express Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617
(1917) (holding that state cannot regulate rates affected by ICC order, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 244
U.S. 82 (1917) (reversing lower court ruling setting aside ICC order, with McRey-
nolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. United States, 243
U.S. 444 (1917) (upholding injunction granted to ICC preventing railroad from
charging less than published rates, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. United States, 243 U.S. 412 (1917) (affirming dis-
missal of action to enjoin enforcement of ICC order, with McReynolds and Van De-
vanter joining opinion); United States v. Merchants & Mfrs. Traffic Ass'n of Sacra-
mento, 242 U.S. 178 (1916) (reversing lower court decision enjoining enforcement of
ICC rate setting order, with Van Devanter and McReynolds joining opinion); 0'
Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294 (1916) (affirming dismissal of suit to enjoin en-
forcement of ICC order, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no
part); Mills v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 238 U.S. 473 (1915) (affirming ruling of ICC
granting reparations for discriminatory rates, with McReynolds and Van Devanter
joining opinion); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 1 (1915)
(affirming order of ICC reducing freight costs for coal, with Van Devanter joining
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opinion) (McReynolds takes no part); Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S.
351 (1915) (holding that ICC has the power to force certain carriers to ship freight
from connecting carriers, with Van Devanter joining opinion) (McReynolds takes no
part); Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914) (upholding ICC order con-
cerning railroad rates for long hauls, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Houston,
E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding that ICC has power
to regulate intrastate rates, with Van Devanter joining opinion); ICC v. Southern
Pac. Co., 234 U.S. 315 (1914) (upholding ICC order preventing railroads from charg-
ing certain switching charges on spur lines, with Van Devanter joining opinion); Los
Angeles Switching Case, 234 U.S. 294 (1914) (upholding ICC order preventing rail-
roads from imposing switching charges, with Van Devanter joining opinion); The Tap
Line Cases, 234 U.S. 1 (1914) (upholding ICC order requiring trunk line railroads to
desist from making allowances to tap line owners, with McReynolds and Van Devan-
ter joining opinion); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 232 U.S. 199 (1914)
(deferring to rate setting power of the ICC, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423 (1913) (reaffirming constitutionality
of ICC's authority to prescribe accounting methods, with Van Devanter joining
opinion); United States v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381 (1913) (upholding ICC's
power to regulate express companies, with Van Devanter joining opinion); ICC v.
Louisville & Nash. R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (upholding ICC order lowering connect-
ing rates, with Van Devanter joining opinion); United States v. Union Stock Yard &
Transit Co., 226 U.S. 286 (1912) (holding that certain companies were within jurisdic-
tion of ICC, with Van Devanter joining opinion); ICC v. United States, 224 U.S. 474
(1912) (holding that the Hepburn Act extends ICC's authority to Alaska, with Van
Devanter joining opinion); ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912)
(upholding Interstate Commerce Act provisions requiring carriers to conduct ac-
counting in the manner prescribed by the ICC, with Van Devanter joining opinion);
ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912) (upholding ICC order despite eviden-
tiary concerns of railroad, with Van Devanter joining opinion); ICC v. Delaware, L.
& W.R.R., 220 U.S. 235 (1911) (upholding ICC order forbidding enforcement of a
carrier rule prohibiting the aggregation of shipments of various owners for the pur-
pose of carload classification, with Van Devanter joining opinion).
76 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (McReynolds, Suth-
erland, and Butler join opinion upholding FTC cease and desist order); FTC v. Kep-
pel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding FTC
cease and desist order); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion upholding FTC cease and desist order); FTC v. Royal Milling
Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (Van Devanter and Butler join Sutherland opinion uphold-
ing FTC cease and desist order); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52
(1927) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion upholding
FTC cease and desist order in price fixing case); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258
U.S. 483 (1922) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding FTC cease and desist order);
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (Van Devanter joins opinion up-
holding FTC cease and desist order) (McReynolds dissents).
11See, e.g., C.E. Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255 (1940)
(McReynolds joins opinion reversing dismissal of Sherman Act suit); Hill v. United
States ex rel. Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1937) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler
join Sutherland's opinion upholding punishment for contempt under Clayton Act);
Indiana Farmer's Guide Publ'g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ'g Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934)
(Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion reversing directed
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verdict for antitrust defendant); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933) (McReynolds dissents from opinion, in which Butler, Sutherland, and Van
Devanter join, finding no Sherman Act violation); Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join
Sutherland's opinion finding Sherman Act violation); Story Parchment Co. v. Pater-
son Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Butler join Sutherland's opinion affirming judgment for antitrust plaintiff); United
States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman Act violation); Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman Act violation); George Van Camp
& Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Butler join Sutherland's opinion finding Clayton Act violation); United States v.
Goldman, 277 U.S. 229 (1928) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing dismissal of
criminal contempt proceedings against defendants charged with violating an injunc-
tion enforcing the Sherman Act); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) (Van
Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion upholding criminal con-
tempt conviction of Sherman Act defendant who refused to comply with a subpoena
duces tecum); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (Van Devanter,
Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman Act violation);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (McReynolds joins opin-
ion upholding Sherman Act conviction) (Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter dis-
sent); United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman Act violation); United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman Act violation); Hart v. B.F. Keith
Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271 (1923) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing
dismissal of antitrust suit); Ramsay Co. v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 260 U.S. 501 (1923)
(Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion finding Sherman
Act violation); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion finding Clayton Act violation); Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion finding Clayton Act violation); American Column & Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming Sherman Act conviction); Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co.,
254 U.S. 233 (1920) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion reversing judgment
directing verdict for Sherman Act defendant); United States v. A. Schrader's Son,
Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion reversing judg-
ment sustaining demurrer to indictment for violation of the Sherman Act); Thomsen
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming
judgment for Sherman Act plaintiff); Straus & Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n,
231 U.S. 222 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion reversing judgment for Sherman
Act defendant); United States v. Pacific & Arc. Ry. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913)
(Van Devanter joins opinion reversing judgment sustaining demurrer to Sherman
Act indictment); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912) (Van De-
vanter joins opinion affirming state antitrust conviction); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion finding Sherman
Act violation); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (Van
Devanter joins opinion invalidating resale price maintenance scheme under Sherman
Act). See also Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
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(holding that a patentee cannot require a licensee to purchase unpatented materials
used in connection with the invention from patentee, with all Four Horsemen joining
opinion); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) (McReynolds joins
opinion invalidating attempt to use a patent to fix prices) (Van Devanter dissents);
United States v. Munday, 222 U.S. 175 (1911) (upholding congressional legislation
seeking to prevent monopolization of coal lands, with Van Devanter joining opinion).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) (Van Devanter
joins opinion holding acquisition of one railroad by another violates Sherman Act)
(McReynolds takes no part); Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156
(1922) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming decree dissolving
combination of railroad and coal companies pursuant to Sherman Act); United States
v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920) (Van Devanter joins opinion dissolving
combination of railroad and coal companies formed in violation of the Sherman Act)
(McReynolds takes no part); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920)
(McReynolds joins opinion dissolving combination of railroad and coal companies
formed in violation of the Sherman Act) (Van Devanter dissents); United States v.
Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 238 U.S. 516 (1915) (Van Devanter joins opinion enjoining
coal transportation because of ShermanAct violation) (McReynolds takes no part);
United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion en-
joining Sherman Act violation); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 224
U.S. 383 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion enjoining Sherman Act violation).
79 See, e.g., Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (all Four Horsemen
join opinion finding that activities of trade association violate the Sherman Act); Ce-
ment Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (McReynolds dis-
sents from opinion, in which Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter join, reversing
order enjoining activities of trade association as violations of the Sherman Act); Ma-
ple Flooring Mfg. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (McReynolds dissents
from opinion, in which Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter join, reversing order
enjoining activities of trade association as violations of the Sherman Act); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (Van De-
vanter joins opinion affirming order enjoining trade association from engaging in ac-
tivities violative of the Sherman Act).
0See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (McReynolds joins
opinion reversing dismissal of indictments for Sherman Act violations); Puerto Rico
v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (McReynolds and Butler join Sutherland's opinion
reversing dismissal of prosecution of Shell for violation of local antitrust law); Alu-
minum Co. v. United States, 302 U.S. 230 (1937) (Sutherland and Butler join
McReynolds' opinion authorizing federal government to bring a second antitrust ac-
tion against ALCOA notwithstanding an earlier consent decree entered in another
district); International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion enjoining certain tying clauses as Clayton Act viola-
tion); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion affirming damage award judgment against Eastman Ko-
dak for antitrust violation); International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199
(1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for the state in Missouri anti-
trust quo warranto proceeding); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion dissolving unlawful combination); Standard
Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion dis-
solving unlawful combination).
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81 See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (McReynolds joins
dissent from opinion overturning Sherman Act judgment against laborers engaged in
a sit-down strike); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274
U.S. 37 (1927) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion
enjoining as a Sherman Act violation a stonecutter union's boycott of stone quarried
by members of unaffiliated unions); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268
U.S. 295 (1925) (all Four Horsemen join opinion which, while exempting the interna-
tional union from liability, holds that there was sufficient evidence of intent to re-
strain trade to allow the company's Sherman Act claim against the local union to go
to the jury); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184
(1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion placing limits on union's rights
to picket); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion enjoining union's secondary boycott as a Sherman Act
violation). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion invalidating state statute barring injunctive relief against
union picketing); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion enjoining UMW's effort to unionize mine
employees engaged under "yellow dog" contracts); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion invalidating state statute pro-
hibiting "yellow dog" contracts). For an analysis of the applicability of antitrust law
to union activity, see Daniel R. Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908-1914, 74 Iowa L.
Rev. 1151 (1989). For a discussion of the Court's yellow dog contract cases, see Barry
Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas: The Case of the Yellow Dog
Contract, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 235.
- 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
Id. at 407.
Id. at 407-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 407-13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
8265 U.S. 457 (1924).
Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
289 U.S. 103 (1933).
Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
91 Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 364 (1926) (emphasis added).
9 National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923). See
also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (Van Devanter joins
opinion reversing criminal contempt conviction of union officials for violating order
enjoining a boycott).
931 In addition to cases cited supra notes 77-80, compare, e.g., United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (finding that U.S. Steel did not violate
Sherman Act) (McReynolds takes no part) and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895) (finding acquisition of local sugar refinery companies by corporation
possessing 98% of the nation's sugar refining capacity did not violate the Sherman
Act) with, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (finding rail-
road combination a restraint of trade); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S.
505 (1898) (finding railroad combination a restraint of trade) and United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (finding contract between railroad
companies void as a restraint of trade). See also Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight
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Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-
1903,53 Bus. Hist. Rev. 304 (1979).
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
15 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
16 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
17See supra note 24.
18 Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923).
"Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steam Ship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join opinion) (McReynolds takes no
part).
10 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (all Four Horse-
men join opinion).
- See, e.g., NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940) (McReynolds joins
opinion supporting NLRB ruling ordering international steamship transport company
to cease commission of unfair labor practices); NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion supporting NLRB ruling
ordering interstate communication company to cease commission of unfair labor
practices); NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938) (McReynolds
and Butler join opinion supporting NLRB ruling ordering interstate transit company
to cease commission of unfair labor practices); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion supporting
NLRB ruling ordering interstate transit company to cease commission of unfair labor
practices); Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion supporting NLRB ruling ordering interstate transit company
to cease commission of unfair labor practices). See also NLRB v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939) (McReynolds joins opinion sup-
porting NLRB ruling ordering company to cease commission of unfair labor prac-
tices).
102 See, e.g., NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (Van
Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' dissent arguing commerce power
does not extend to intrastate manufacture of goods); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
301 U.S. 49 (1937) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(same).
103 See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913).
10 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
,0 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The State Rights Fetish, in New Viewpoints in American
History 220 (1922).
'°6 See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940) (McReynolds joins
opinion supporting NLRB ruling ordering company to cease unfair labor practices);
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion
supporting NLRB ruling ordering company to cease unfair labor practices). I might
also ask what you make of Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753 v. Lake Valley
Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) (McReynolds joins opinion affirming dismissal of
action by retailer to enjoin union from picketing store), and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264
U.S. 286 (1924) and Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kan-
sas, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (all Four Horsemen join opinions striking down Kansas
Court of Industrial Relations Act, which instituted a system of compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes and deprived unions of their rights to strike, boycott and picket).
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117 See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 215 (1927).
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9 See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Butler join Sutherland's opinion upholding statute prohibiting employment of
women in large-city restaurants between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.); United States v.
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 249 U.S. 296 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion holding terminal subject to the Federal Hours of Service Act); Dominion
Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion upholding statute limiting working hours of women in hotels); Chicago &
A.R.R. v. United States, 247 U.S. 197 (1918) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds'
opinion affirming conviction for violation of the Federal Hours of Service Act);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 U.S. 336 (1917) (Van Devanter joins
opinion affirming conviction for violation of the Federal Hours of Service Act)
(McReynolds takes no part); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (Van Devan-
ter and McReynolds join opinion upholding maximum hours law for women); Miller
v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion uphold-
ing maximum hours law for women); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding maximum hours law for women); Riley v. Massa-
chusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding maximum hours
law for women); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 112 (1913) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding convictions for violations of Federal Hours of
Service Act); United States v. Garbish, 222 U.S. 257 (1911) (Van Devanter joins
opinion strictly construing exceptions to an eight-hour workday law for public
works); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion
upholding Federal Hours of Service Act).
10See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273
U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
M See, e.g., Letter from Edith Houghton Hooker to George Sutherland (April 5,
1937); Letter from Anna Keeton Wiley to George Sutherland (March 30, 1937); Let-
ter from Ruth G. Williams to George Sutherland (June 3, 1936) (on file with the Vir-
ginia Law Review Association).
-See Thompson v. Lucas, 252 U.S. 358 (1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion upholding provisions of Seamen's Act providing for payment of one-half
wages on demand by seaman at port); Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348
(1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding provisions of Sea-
men's Act providing for payment of one-half wages on demand by seaman at port);
Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion upholding statute directing that, where miners' wages were determined
by the weight of the coal they mined, the weighing take place before the coal was
screened); Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914) (Van Devanter
joins opinion upholding statute requiring that all store orders or other evidence of
indebtedness issued by specified employers in payment of wages be redeemable in
cash); Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion up-
holding statute requiring semi-monthly, cash payment of wages in specified indus-
tries); Charles W. McCurdy, The Liberty of Contract Regime in American Law
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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-3See, e.g., Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 303 U.S. 10 (1938) (McReynolds and
Butler join opinion upholding award under FSAA); Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry., 294 U.S. 529 (1935) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing directed ver-
dict for defendant under FSAA); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205
(1934) (upholding federal court's jurisdiction of employee's injury claims under the
FSAA in connection with FELA by reversing a lower court determination adverse to
employee, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
288 U.S. 275 (1933) (Van Devanter and Sutherland join opinion upholding award
under FELA) (McReynolds and Butler dissent); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S.
635 (1930) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion af-
firming award under FELA for injuries sustained by stevedore assaulted by his fore-
man); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Ward, 252 U.S. 18 (1920) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v.
Holloway, 246 U.S. 525 (1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirm-
ing award under FELA); Union Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918) (Van De-
vanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee under FELA);
Great N. Ry. v. Donaldson, 246 U.S. 121 (1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming award under FELA); Union Pac. R.R. v. Huxoll, 245 U.S. 535
(1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA
and FSAA); Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Scala, 244 U.S. 630 (1917) (Van Devan-
ter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); New York Cent. &
H.R.R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opin-
ion affirming award under FELA); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S.
66 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under
FELA); St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311 (1917) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Williams, 242 U.S. 462 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
affirming award under FSAA); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 295 (1916)
(Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Balti-
more & O.R.R. v. Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion affirming award under FELA); Atlantic City R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA);
Spokane & I. Emp. R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); San Antonio &
Ark. Pass Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bower,
241 U.S. 470 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Proffitt, 241 U.S. 462 (1916) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290 (1916) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion affirming
award under FELA); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Stewart, 241 U.S. 261 (1916) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming award under FELA); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Brown, 241 U.S. 223
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA);
Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award un-
der FSAA); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Great N. Ry. v. Knapp,
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240 U.S. 464 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Skaggs, 240 U.S. 66 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA notwithstanding error in con-
tributory negligence instruction); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Wright, 239 U.S. 548
(1916) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion affirming award under FELA);
Chicago & A.R.R. v. Wagner, 239 U.S. 452 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion affirming award under FELA and invalidating company's attempt to
contract out of liability under the Act); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239
U.S. 352 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under
FELA); Great N. Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S. 349 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds
join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Ferebee,
238 U.S. 269 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); New York Cent. & R.R.R.R. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260 (1915) (Van De-
vanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Yazoo & Miss.
Valley R.R. v. Wright, 235 U.S. 376 (1914) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming award under FELA); Southern Ry. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 725 (1914)
(Van Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Grand
Trunk W. Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming
award under FELA); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317 (1913) (Van
Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Norfolk & W. Ry.
v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913) (Van Devanter writes opinion affirming award under
FELA); Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912) (Van Devanter
joins opinion affirming award under FELA and invalidating company's attempt to
contract out of liability under the Act); Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 222 U.S. 222
(1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FSAA); Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding
award under FSAA).
114 See, e.g., Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540 (1924) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion holding that bystander enlisted by
conductor to unload heavy freight at station was employed in interstate commerce);
Erie R.R. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86 (1920) (McReynolds joins opinion holding that an
employee whose duty it was to dry sand in stoves in a small structure near the tracks
and to supply it to locomotives used in both inter-and intrastate commerce, injured
while returning from getting a drink of water when returning from an ash-pit whither
he had gone to dump ashes taken by him from one of the stoves after sanding loco-
motives bound for other states, was employed in interstate commerce) (Van Devan-
ter dissents); Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920) (McReynolds joins opinion
holding that employee injured while running a gasoline engine to pump water into a
tank for use by locomotives was employed in interstate commerce) (Van Devanter
dissents); Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry., 250 U.S. 130 (1919) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion holding that employee injured while removing dirt and
stones from track was employed in interstate commerce); Southern Ry. v. Puckett,
244 U.S. 571 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion holding that em-
ployee who tripped in a train yard while on his way to assist in the rescue of a fellow
employee trapped under a wrecked car was employed in interstate commerce); Min-
neapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353 (1917) (Van Devanter and McRey-
nolds join opinion upholding judgment for injured employee notwithstanding fact
that employee was not engaged in interstate commerce at time of injury, because de-
fendant did not object to the application of FELA at trial); Pedersen v. Delaware, L.
& W.R.R., 229 U.S. 146 (1913) (Van Devanter writes opinion holding that an em-
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ployee injured while carrying bolts to be used to repair a railroad bridge used by in-
terstate trains was employed in interstate commerce).
Hs 250 U.S. 101 (1919).
,,6 McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943).
7 See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532
(1935) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of California's statute);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (upholding Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Staten Island
Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 281 U.S. 98 (1930) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion upholding provisions of New York's statute); Booth Fisheries Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 271 U.S. 208 (1926) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provi-
sions of Wisconsin's statute); R.E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371 (1924) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of New York's statute); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) (Van Devanter joins Sutherland's
opinion upholding provisions of Utah's statute) (Butler and McReynolds dissent);
Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499 (1923) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of California's statute); Ward & Gow v.
Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding provisions of
New York's statute) (McReynolds dissents); Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd.,
255 U.S. 144 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding provi-
sions of Indiana's statute); New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding provision of New York's statute) (McReynolds dis-
sents); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion upholding Iowa's statute); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding New York's statute).
18 See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936) (Van Devanter, Suth-
erland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding award despite claim that it
intruded upon the maritime jurisdiction); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co.,
289 U.S. 439 (1933) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding award); Voehl v. In-
demnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding
award under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Boston &
Me. R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932) (all Four Horsemen join opinion uphold-
ing award); Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion upholding award); Millers' Indem.
Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler
join McReynolds' opinion affirming state workmen's compensation award); State In-
dus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922) (Van Devanter joins McRey-
nolds' opinion reversing judgment vacating award). See also United States v. Arzner,
287 U.S. 470 (1933) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opin-
ion upholding award under World War Veterans' Act); Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408 (1932) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
McReynolds join Butler's opinion upholding award under Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act).
I" See, e.g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941)
(McReynolds concurs in result of opinion reversing dismissal of employee's action);
Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing
dismissal of employee's action under Merchant Marine Act of 1920); Vancouver S.S.
Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join
Butler's opinion affirming judgment giving decedent stevedore's administratrix a
cause of action enforceable in admiralty in rem against the vessel on which the inju-
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ries were sustained); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion holding that failure to furnish adequate care to a sea-
man stricken with pneumonia was a personal injury giving the seaman's administrator
a cause of action against the employer under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920); Ur-
avic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931) (all Four Horsemen join opinion interpreting
broadly the term "seaman" in the Merchant Marine Act so as to create a cause of ac-
tion for a stevedore injured while unloading a ship flying the German flag); Gon-
salves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171 (1924) (Van Devanter, Suth-
erland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion interpreting jurisdiction of admiralty
court widely enough to allow it to hear an employee's personal injury claim); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923) (Van Devanter, Suth-
erland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding federal district court's juris-
diction to entertain wrongful death action); Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250
U.S. 76 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion reversing judgment for
employer on grounds that jury instruction was erroneous); Erie R.R. v. Purucker, 244
U.S. 320 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for
employee); Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Louisville & Nash.
R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion af-
firming judgment for employee); Erie R.R. v. Welsh, 242 U.S. 303 (1916) (Van De-
vanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Louisville &
Nash. R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 13 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opin-
ion affirming judgment for employee); Brown v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 241 U.S. 571
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for em-
ployee); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Osborne v. Gray, 241
U.S. 16 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds joins opinion affirming judgment for
employee); Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 233 U.S. 184 (1914) (Van Devanter joins
opinion affirming judgment for employee); Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S.
94 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for employee); Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Harvey, 228 U.S. 319 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judg-
ment for employee); George A. Fuller Co. v. McCloskey, 228 U.S. 194 (1913) (Van
Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for employee).
10 See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) (Butler joins
opinion affirming judgment for injured seaman and holding that assumption of risk
was not a defense under the Jones Act) (McReynolds dissents, contending that the
trial court erroneously refused defendant's request for a jury instruction on the avail-
ability of an assumption of risk defense); Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (all
Four Horsemen join opinion affirming judgment for injured seaman and holding that
neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence were defenses in actions un-
der the Jones Act or the maritime law); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936)
(all Four Horsemen join opinion affirming a judgment for an injured seaman and
holding that assumption of risk was not a defense under the Jones Act); Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Suth-
erland join Butler's opinion affirming judgment for employee and holding constitu-
tional an Arkansas statute abrogating the fellow servant rule in cases involving
corporate defendants); Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29 (1917) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee and upholding provisions
of a Kansas statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the doctrines of contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571
638 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:559
(1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for em-
ployee and upholding Ohio statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the doc-
trines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk); Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for
employee and upholding Indiana statute abrogating fellow servant rule in railroad
cases); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion
affirming judgment for employee and upholding Nebraska statute abrogating the
fellow servant rule and the doctrine of contributory negligence in railroad cases).
11 See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (McReynolds joins opinion
overturning contempt conviction of plaintiff for refusing to submit to a physical ex-
amination); The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935) (holding that an allegation of
negligence against a ship was in admiralty and as a result the suit could go forward,
with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); Fairport, P. & E.R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S.
589 (1934) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion af-
firming judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding her contributory negligence); Pokora
v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing a judg-
ment directing a verdict for the defendant); Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411
(1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing judgment directing a verdict for the
defendant); Miller v. Union Pac. R.R., 290 U.S. 227 (1933) (Van Devanter, McRey-
nolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion reversing judgment dismissing plaintiff's
petition); Atlantic Coast L.R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff
and upholding statute creating rebuttable presumption of railroad's negligence); Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86 (1932) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Sutherland join Butler's opinion dismissing defendant's appeal notwithstanding trial
court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on the issue of contributory negligence,
and upholding statute creating rebuttable presumption of railroad's negligence);
Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and upholding statute allowing punitive
damage awards in respondeat superior wrongful death cases); Doullut & Williams
Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 33 (1925) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join
McReynolds' opinion reversing judgment dismissing libels for want of admiralty ju-
risdiction); Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and ruling that railroad
carriers cannot limit their common law liability by contracting for exemption from the
consequences of their own negligence); Panama R.R. v. Toppin, 252 U.S. 308 (1920)
(Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); New
York Cent. R.R. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152 (1920) (McReynolds joins, Van Devanter
concurs in opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Cole,
251 U.S. 54 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment
for plaintiff); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Chatman, 244 U.S. 276 (1917) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and voiding stipulation in
drover's pass exempting carrier from liability for personal injuries caused by its own
negligence); Chicago & A.R.R. v. McWhirt, 243 U.S. 422 (1917) (McReynolds joins
Van Devanter's opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); McAllister v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 243 U.S. 302 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion reversing
dismissal of plaintiffs action); Memphis St. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 299 (1917) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Munsey v.
Webb, 231 U.S. 150 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for
plaintiff); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Stewart, 228 U.S. 357 (1913) (Van Devanter joins
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opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Southern Pac. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.S. 601
(1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff).
122 See Michael E. Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression
1920-1941, 104 (1992).
-z See Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion holding that the Fourth Amendment barred introduction at federal trial of
evidence seized by New York state police from accused's automobile without a war-
rant and without probable cause, and turned over to federal authorities for prosecu-
tion).
124 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (Van Devanter, McRey-
nolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion reversing conviction where police acting
pursuant to an arrest warrant for violation of the liquor laws arrested defendants at
their place of business and proceeded to search desks and filing cabinets in the office,
and to seize various papers for use against the defendants at trial, on ground that the
papers had not been in plain view and the search of the desks and cabinets was there-
fore not a lawful search incident to arrest).
1- 238 U.S. 62 (1915).
116 Id. at 66. Accord, Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 202 (1915). See
also United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 428 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(contending that the Reed "Bone-Dry" Amendment, as construed by the majority,
was unconstitutional).
'n287 U.S. 206 (1932).
18287 U.S. 124 (1932).
19 See also United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (each of his fellow
Horsemen joins Sutherland's opinion construing a "tax" under the Prohibition Act as
not truly a tax but instead a penalty, and holding that a civil action to recover such
tax was barred by a prior conviction based upon the same transaction); Corneli v.
Moore, 257 U.S. 491 (1922) (McReynolds dissents from opinion holding that owner
of liquor store who paid tax on liquor purchased before ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment was not deprived of due process by being prevented from taking the liq-
uor home for personal consumption following ratification); Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania,
258 U.S. 403 (1922) (McReynolds dissents from opinion affirming conviction of man
accused of selling liquor without a license); United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450
(1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding motion to quash in-
dictment against defendant charged with not paying taxes on distilled spirits). For
the origins of the tax/penalty distinction in the Four Horsemen's jurisprudence, see
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
In 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting).
'3'302 U.S. 379 (1937).
2 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). See also United States v. Falcone,
311 U.S. 205 (1940) (McReynolds joins opinion reversing conviction of the Falcone
and Nole brothers and Henry Alberico for conspiring to violate the revenue laws by
selling goods to a person whom they knew was going to use the goods to make illegal
alcohol).
W 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
04 Id. at 163 (McReynolds and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting). Compare Justice Butler
on circuit in United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662 (1926) ("Abhorrence, however
great, of persistent and menacing crime will not excuse transgression in the courts of
640 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:559
the legal rights of the worst offenders."). See David J. DaneIski, A Supreme Court
Justice is Appointed, 182 (1964).
13- Carroll, 267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 169 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
-- 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
138290 U.S. 41 (1933).
. 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
40See also Fleisher v. United States, 302 U.S. 218 (1937) (per curiam)
(McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler join opinion overturning a conviction of con-
spiracy to possess products used to distill spirits unlawfully on the ground that the in-
dictment failed to state an offense); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935)
and United States v. Kesterson, 296 U.S. 299 (1935) (all Four Horsemen join opinions
overturning convictions of liquor dealers for failure to pay a federal excise of $1,000
imposed upon those selling alcohol contrary to state or local law, interpreting the ex-
cise as a penalty for violation of state law rather than a true tax, and accordingly in-
validating it on Tenth Amendment grounds); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933), (McReynolds joins opinion construing a treaty with Britain detailing the
rights of the United States to seize British ships suspected of smuggling liquor into
the United States not to allow the particular search in question) (Butler and Suther-
land dissent) (Van Devanter takes no part); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1
(1932) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion reversing
conviction based on evidence secured through warrantless search of garage from
which Prohibition agents had detected the odor of whiskey); Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932) (Butler, J., dissenting) (stating that he would reverse the
conviction of Dunn under the National Prohibition Act, on ground that possession of
illegal alcohol not proved); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion overturn-
ing convictions and invalidating exploratory search conducted by Prohibition agents
acting pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant and without a search warrant, who ob-
tained incriminating evidence by using threats of force to coerce defendant to open a
desk and safe); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (Van Devanter, McRey-
nolds, and Butler join Sutherland opinion overturning conviction of defendant
charged with possession with intent to defraud of counterfeit strip stamps of the kind
used upon whiskey bottled in bond, on grounds that evidence found by federal agent
while accompanying state agents on a search of defendant's home under authority of
a defective state search warrant, but without a federal warrant, could not be used in a
federal trial); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926) (McReynolds, Suther-
land, and Butler, dissenting, vote to invalidate a federal statute strictly regulating the
amount of alcohol a physician could prescribe for medicinal use); United States y.
One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 335 (1926) (McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Butler dissent from opinion upholding and interpreting broadly various seizure
and taxation provisions of the Supplementary Prohibition Act); Samuels v. McCurdy,
267 U.S. 188, 200 (1925) (Butler dissents from opinion, which McReynolds, Suther-
land, and Van Devanter join, upholding Georgia statute authorizing seizure and de-
struction of alcohol that had been purchased legally before the enactment of the stat-
ute); and Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion reversing conviction for illegal possession of whiskey where
evidence of the infraction had been secured through a warrantless search of the de-
fendant's home, which the defendant's wife had permitted under conditions of
"implied coercion").
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"' 241 U.S. 394 (1916).
See also McGinis v. California, 247 U.S. 91 (1918), 247 U.S. 95 (1918) (Van De-
vanter and McReynolds join opinions reversing California state convictions for pos-
session of opium and cocaine on Commerce Clause grounds).
,+1249 U.S. 86 (1919) (reversing decision sustaining demurrer of indictment of phy-
sician charged with prescribing drugs in a manner proscribed by the Act).
I4M Id. at 95 (White, C.J., and McKenna, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, JJ., dis-
senting); see also Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 100 (1919) (White, C.J., and
McKenna, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting from opinion upholding
the conviction of a physician for prescribing morphine to a habitual user).
145 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
'46 Id. at 18, 22.
,47 Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 354 (1928) (McReynolds and Sutherland,
JJ., dissenting); Id. at 357 (Butler and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting).
"276 U.S. 413 (1928).
,4 9 Id. at 420 (McReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissenting).
110 Id. at 421 (Brandeis and Butler, JJ., dissenting).
- Id. at 426 (Butler, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 289
(1922) (McReynolds joins dissent from opinion reversing judgment sustaining demur-
rer to indictment under the Act).
0 269 U.S. 360 (1926).
5I Id. at 364.
114 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925).
' 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
' See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Wilson v. United States, 232
U.S. 563 (1914); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
' Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
' 285 U.S. 424, 427 (1932) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
'
59 Id. at 425.
-- 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Sil-
verthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
.16274 U.S. 220 (1927).
1- 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
0 See Richard C. Cortner, A "Scottsboro" Case In Mississippi: The Supreme Court
and Brown v. Mississippi (1986).
16 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) (all Four Horsemen joining
opinion).
16 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (McReynolds, the sole remaining
Horseman, joining opinion).
' 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
16See also Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920) (Van Devanter joins
McReynolds' opinion holding that involuntary bankruptcy did not waive privilege
against self-incrimination by disclosing to the court schedules showing assets and li-
abilities).
-- 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
16 Id.
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17291 U.S. 97,, 123 (1934) (Roberts, Brandeis, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ., dissent-
ing).
1 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
- 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Butler and McReynolds dissent).
7 See also Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (rev. ed.
1979).
'7-283 U.S. 308 (1931).
17- See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (McReynolds joins opinion reversing the
rape conviction of a black man indicted by an all-white grand jury); Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (McReynolds and Bulter join opinion voiding the indictment
of a black man for the murder of a white man by a grand jury from which blacks had
been systematically excluded); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per curiam)
(McReynolds and Butler joining a similar opinion); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S.
394 (1935) (per curiam) (all Four Horsemen joining opinion to the same effect); Nor-
ris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join
opinion reversing conviction in the second trial of Clarence Norris, one of the
"Scottsboro boys," on the ground that blacks had been systematically excluded from
jury service in the county in which he had been tried) (McReynolds takes no part in
the decision); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (Van Devanter, Sutherland,
and Butler join opinion reversing conviction of another "Scottsboro boy," Haywood
Patterson, on the same ground) (McReynolds takes no part in the decision).
176 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 151 (1936) (McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler, JJ., dissenting).
- District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
7 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633 (1937) (opinion of McRey-
nolds and Butler, JJ.).
17 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
'-261 U.S. 86 (1923).
I'l Id. at 87, 92; see Richard C. Cortner, A Mob Intent on Death: The NAACP and
the Arkansas Riot Cases (1988).
'8 3Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
18 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
289 U.S. 466 (1933).
' 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
18273 U.S. 583 (1927).
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 518-19, 532.
19 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
'-267 U.S. 87 (1925).
19, Id. at 107-08, 122.
192 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
193 See, e.g., United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U.S. 68 (1939) (upholding
reversal of criminal indictment because of statute of limitations, with Butler joining
McReynolds' opinion); United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (McReynolds and Butler joining dissent from opinion re-
versing appellate court ruling which overturned a criminal conviction for counter-
feiting); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937) (reversing grand larceny convic-
tion because defendant was sentenced under law passed after crime was committed,
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with Butler, McReynolds, and Sutherland joining opinion); Valentine v. United
States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (declaring that, unless specifically granted
power by Congress, the executive has no power to extradite fugitive criminals, with
all Four Horseman joining opinion); Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S.
460 (1936) (rejecting addition to sentence requiring that defendant remain in prison
until a fine is paid, with all Four Horseman joining opinion); United States v. Hast-
ings, 296 U.S. 188 (1935) (ruling that Court must accept construction of indictment by
district court in affirming a dismissal of a criminal indictment under the Warehouse
Act, with all Four Horseman joining opinion); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935)
(granting habeas corpus petition to probationer who was detained without a hearing,
with all Four Horseman joining opinion); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(per curiam) (holding that criminal conviction obtained by prosecutors who know-
ingly relied on perjured testimony in order to convict violated due process, with all
Four Horseman joining opinion); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 305 (1933)
(Butler dissents from opinion, in which McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter
join, upholding extradition of defendant to foreign country, even though crime com-
mitted overseas was not a crime in the United States); Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96 (1933) (disallowing as too prejudicial the written statement by dying wife that
her husband poisoned her, with all Four Horsemen joining opinion); South Carolina
v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 422 (1933) (Butler dissents from opinion, written by McRey-
nolds and joined by Sutherland and Van Devanter, setting high standard for habeas
corpus petitioner to meet in order to prevent extradition to another state for murder
indictment); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) (declaring unconstitutional
a state antitrust statute because it lacked a fixed standard of guilt, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
(declaring unconstitutional as violating due process a criminal statute because of its
vagueness, with Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter joining Sutherland's opin-
ion); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924) (construing in favor of criminal defendant
one's right to challenge prosecution under a habeas corpus proceeding, with Butler,
McReynolds, and Sutherland joining Van Devanter's opinion); United States v. Mo-
reland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922) (affirming reversal of criminal sentence because of lack of
indictment by grand jury, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion);
Krichman v. United States, 256 U.S. 363 (1921) (reversing bribery conviction of rail-
road porter because porter was not acting on behalf of the United States in any offi-
cial capacity, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) (reversing murder conviction because of improper jury
instruction, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); Ex Parte Hudg-
ings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919) (holding that court could adjudge a witness guilty of con-
tempt and imprison him solely because in the court's opinion he was willfully refusing
to testify truthfully, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining opinion); United
States v. Weitzel, 246 U.S. 533 (1918) (upholding demurrer to criminal indictment
against bank receiver for bribery because, as an officer of United States, he could not
be tried under the statute in question, with McReynolds and Van Devanter joining
opinion); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 353 (1918) (McReynolds and Van
Devanter dissent from opinion affirming conviction under state law forbidding the
grazing of cattle and sheep on herding lands); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242
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